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THESIS ABSTRACT 
  
Liam A. Machado 
  
Master of Arts 
  
Department of the History of Art and Architecture 
  
June 2019 
  
Title: The Nation Arrested: Propaganda and Human Rights at Argentina ‘78 
  
  
This thesis examines the graphic design and propaganda generated by the 1978 
FIFA World Cup in Argentina. The football tournament drew ever more scrutiny to the 
brutal repression carried out by the country’s military dictatorship, which had ruled 
Argentina since 1976. Increasingly, the World Cup became couched in terms of a conflict 
between morality and violence, innocence and conspiracy, with the dictatorship seeking 
to absolve itself through the image of a modern and welcoming event, and a European 
boycott strongly associating its repressive methods with the Holocaust. The visual 
materials created for and in response to the World Cup, by the government and by activist 
groups boycotting the tournament, respectively, reveal a struggle to define the most 
pertinent image of Argentina: that of a stable, modern, and upright society, or one of a 
fascist-ruled, cynical nation, living in fear. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE LAND OF THE LIVING 
 Graciela Daleo remembers the night of Sunday, June 25, 1978 well. She was in a 
car somewhere along Avenida Cabildo in Buenos Aires, and traffic had ground to a halt. 
Cheering pedestrians had flooded the street, waving thousands of Argentinian flags. “I 
asked [the guard] if he could open up the roof, I wanted to stand up and see. I saw that 
great crowd and I started to cry. I knew one thing for sure: if I screamed that I was a 
desaparecida, no one would care...because we no longer belonged to the land of the 
living.”1 Daleo, a militant activist, had been abducted and imprisoned just blocks away at 
the Escuela Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA) since the previous October. Halfway 
through her eighteen-month detention came the watershed moment that she describes in 
her testimony: citizens flocked to the streets because Argentina won a football 
championship. 
This thesis examines the diverse imagery of the 1978 FIFA World Cup, produced, 
sponsored, and manipulated by both the last Argentinian dictatorship (el Proceso de 
Reorganización Nacional, or National Reorganization Process) and its political critics 
abroad. The 1976 coup that unseated president Isabel Perón gave way to the systematic 
elimination of “terrorists,” “Marxist subversives,” guerrillas, and other individuals of 
disparate, but often leftist, political leanings.2 In the midst of this political rupture, 
                                                
1 Gonzalo, Bonadeo, Diego Guebel and Mario Pergolini, dirs. Mundial ’78, la historia 
paralela. Cuatro Cabezas, 2003. Daleo’s testimony is also cited in Ezequiel Fernández Moores, Breve 
historia del deporte argentino (Buenos Aires: Editorial El Ateneo, 2010), 164, and Matías Bauso, 78. 
Historia oral del Mundial (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2018), 631 and 634-35. 
 
2 Marcos Novaro and Vicente Palermo, La dictadura militar 1976-1983: del golpe de Estado a la  
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however, the Mundial, as all World Cups are colloquially known in Latin America, 
became one of the most pressing issues at stake in Argentina; the decision to stick with 
the tournament was a political one, made at the behest of General Jorge Rafael Videla’s 
military junta. A successful World Cup, it was reasoned, could be used to deflect 
attention away from forced disappearances, indiscriminate torture, and political killings. 
When the Proceso finally relinquished power to a democratic administration, five years 
after the tournament, approximately 30,000 detenidos-desaparecidos had been erased 
from the face of the earth in one of Latin America’s most notorious genocides.3 The 1978 
World Cup has subsequently become tainted by association. 
More than forty years after Argentina’s World Cup, the relationship between 
football and the dictatorship remains a rich topic of study. The all-encompassing nature 
of the event, and the intersection of pressing sociopolitical factors—human rights, sport, 
commercialism, the junta’s consolidation of public support—have been interrogated 
further in recent years, reframed as a series of fragmented and counterintuitive 
experiences with lasting societal consequences. Was the Mundial a deliberate 
smokescreen for the genocide built on marketing and nationalism, as it has come to be 
remembered in Argentina, or did Videla and company simply capitalize on the existing 
well of enthusiasm for the game? For decades, visual culture, literature, and activism 
                                                                                                                                            
restauración democrática (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2003), 83. “Paso a paso...fue tomando forma la doctrina 
de seguridad nacional, que identificó un enemigo social, político e ideológico con muchos rostros y brazos, 
que actuaba en distintos terrenos y con variadas formas organizativas y métodos: la ‘subversión’.” 
 
3 The exact number of detenidos-desaparecidos who lost their lives to the military dictatorship in 
Argentina has been debated at length since the return to democracy. CONADEP, the truth commission 
established by the democratic government under president Raúl Alfonsín, estimated in 1984 that 8,960 
people remained missing; revised estimates now place the number of disappeared at somewhere between 
15,000 to 30,000. The latter figure is the one most often cited by human rights groups in Argentina today. 
See Nunca Más: Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (Buenos Aires: 
Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1984). 
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aimed at dismantling the apolitical arguments in favor of the Mundial have often taken 
the former as fact.4 After the Mundial fell under the junta’s jurisdiction, prominent 
figures in the military hierarchy, including Videla and Carlos Lacoste of the Navy, 
explained the decision to persist with the tournament as a political one with very real 
international consequences for Argentina’s image.5 Literary critic Beatriz Sarlo, too, has 
deemed Argentinian society complicit in enabling the irreversible momentum of the 
Mundial—expressing a sense of alienation in her own country during those fevered 
twenty-five days in June, and disappointment that her compatriots have discreetly 
attempted to ignore the correlation between the Mundial and human rights abuses in the 
four decades since: “we thought that a specific type of highly complex surgery would 
leave the football untainted.”6  
The “highly complex surgery” to which Sarlo refers was impossible, of course. 
The propaganda surrounding the 1978 World Cup was marked by strong narrative 
through lines and explicit political rhetoric that often transcended the football on display, 
                                                
4 These include the films Mundial 78, la historia paralela (2003) and La Otra Final (2008); the 
books El terror y la gloria (Gilbert 1998) and La vergüenza de todos (Llonto 2005); the commemorative 
football match known as the Game for Human Rights and Memory (2008); and the exhibitions Memorias 
del Mundial 78: una reflexión sobre deporte, DDHH y dictadura and Tiren Papelitos: Mundial 78 entre la 
fiesta y el horror (both 2018), referenced later in this chapter. All of the aforementioned interventions 
default, in similar wording, to the position that the Mundial was organized to cover up the alarming rate of 
desapariciones in the host country. See also the 1967 short story “Esse est percipi,” by Jorge Luis Borges 
and Adolfo Bioy Casares, wherein football in Argentina is no longer played but instead performed via the 
“bogus excitement” of player-actors and radio sportscasters. 
 
5 Bauso 191. “Es una decisión política. Eso declaró cada jerarca de la dictadura cada vez que en 
esos meses del 78 se le preguntaba sobre los motivos que los llevaron a continuar con la organización del 
torneo. Una decisión política. La dictadura buscaba mejorar su imagen exterior y, a la vez, consolidar el 
frente interno.” 
 
6 Beatriz Sarlo, “Mundial 78, un tabú de la conciencia argentina,” in Perfil, June 8, 2014. “Se 
creyó que era posible una especie de cirugía de alta complejidad que habría garantizado que la pelota 
quedara limpia… Los que fuimos refractarios a la borrachera deportiva que culminó con la victoria 
recordamos esos días en los que nos sentimos extranjeros en nuestro país porque nada podíamos compartir 
de una oleada de sentimiento colectivo.’ 
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but also weaponized it. With Argentina backing itself into a diplomatic corner over 
human rights, a global competition to showcase the morality and supremacy of the 
Argentinian people was a useful nationalist tool for the military regime, particularly 
given the regional backlash against Communist and progressive movements.7 These 
ideological points of contention surfaced in the official imagery and exhaustive local 
press coverage of the Mundial, as well as the politically charged illustrations that 
responded to them in service of a pan-European boycott.  
Due to the high graphic output associated with the Mundial, I believe it is fruitful 
to analyze the tournament through the lenses of art history and visual culture. I aim to tie 
together disparate strands of analysis that, to date, have largely focused on the 
tournament’s political controversy—Videla as the public face of the Mundial, foreign 
footballers voicing their opposition to the dictatorship, and so on.8 This thesis treats the 
emblems, posters, and political cartoons of the Mundial not as symptoms of these 
polemics, but as vehicles for potent ideological messages that shaped local and 
international perceptions of the tournament. The imagery of the 1978 World Cup, in other 
words, was not just background noise. 
Consequently, two key research questions guide this paper. Firstly, how were 
these visual materials designed, and to what ends? For some of the images, such as the 
Argentina ‘78 official logo and the abundance of mascot Mundialito-branded trinkets 
                                                
7 Novaro and Palermo 166. “El olvido fue, sin lugar a dudas, una posibilidad muy real en ese 
entonces porque el espiritu del Mundial les permitió dejarse llevar a muchos de los que hasta entonces les 
había resultado imposible sumergirse en los mecanismos de negación: se dispusieron a convener 
tácitamente que el terror era cosa del pasado, y que nadie debía cometer la descortesia de recordarlo…” 
 
8 Two eminent footballers of the era, West German midfielder Paul Breitner and Dutch attacker 
Johan Cruyff, were seen as having withdrawn from their national sides because of their opposition to the 
Argentinian dictatorship. While Breitner proudly expressed his left-leaning political sympathies, Cruyff 
later dismissed his absence on political grounds, citing personal reasons. See Bauso, 229-232 and 235-36. 
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post-1974, the avenues afforded by the brands’ commercialization and longevity made 
them easily recognizable to a global audience. Conversely, the Paris-based Committee for 
the Boycott of the Organization of the World Cup in Argentina (COBA) and the 
galvanization of European leftist and human rights activist movements in France, West 
Germany, and other nations relied heavily on word of mouth and a grassroots approach to 
awareness.  
Secondly, how did these images contest the legitimacy of the World Cup and/or 
the dictatorship, and did they do so in a convincing manner? In other words, what picture 
of Argentina and its World Cup did they “sell” to their respective audiences, and what are 
the conceits that made them viable and striking visually? Several illustrations that 
respond to the Mundial, created by European artists in favor of boycotting the event, 
subvert the tournament’s patriotic branding materials and/or denounce the state of mass 
political detentions and killings. However, these images often feature graphic 
representations of torture or injury and bear little reference or resemblance to the realities 
of violence under the Videla regime, such as the mundane and decidedly un-
concentration camp like architecture of clandestine torture sites. As a result, I find it 
intriguing to interrogate what, exactly, images spawned from the boycott. Why are these 
political cartoons so unreflective of state terror in the host nation, and what historical 
precedents do they turn to in order to illustrate the Argentinian genocide? In what ways, 
if at all, do they succeed in highlighting the suffering of the desaparecidos? 
Finally, a disclaimer: the contestation of Argentina’s image and legitimacy vis-a-
vis the Mundial was not a bifurcated dialogue. The scope and types of imagery that have 
secured Argentina ‘78’s place in the public consciousness are admittedly more diverse 
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that the selection presented here; they are limited not only to emblems, posters, and 
political cartoons, but to films, photographs, magazines, and more, a marker of the 
tournament’s all-encompassing presence and totalizing rhetoric. This arena also features 
contributions from parties such as the Movimiento Peronista Montoneros, whose 
opposition to the dictatorship clashed with the patriotic pride of winning the World Cup, 
resulting in imagery quite distinct from the case studies I will present later in this thesis.9 
For the sake of brevity, I will largely analyze images made by Europeans, for European 
audiences, and by a particular subset of Argentinians, for Argentinian audiences. 
Nonetheless there is considerable room for further analysis as the fragmented dimensions 
of the Mundial’s visual culture continue to be reassembled.  
Scholarship and Methodology 
Contextual analysis of the images in this thesis draws heavily from the work of 
design historian Marta Almeida, who has written two key articles on the branding and 
propaganda of Argentina ‘78: first, an examination of European boycott fliers and 
political cartoons, in light of the May 1968 riots in Paris and regional memories of the 
Holocaust (2013); and then a comparison of the locally informed-vs.-modern design 
influences adopted by Mexico ‘68 Olympics and Argentina ‘78, respectively (2014).  I 
also cite several columns from the project “Papelitos, 78 historias sobre un Mundial en 
dictadura” (2018), a collaboration between the Royal Embassy of the Netherlands, 
Memoria Abierta, and Argentinian arts and culture magazine NAN. “Papelitos,” which 
fields journalistic contributions into nearly all dimensions of the Mundial, features 
                                                
9 Nicolás Sagaian, “Los panfletos de Montoneros durante el Mundial: La resistencia silenciosa,” in 
“Papelitos: 78 historias sobre un Mundial en dictadura,” 2018. 
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numerous pieces on the propaganda, boycott, and communications media of the 
tournament—including the initial efforts of Amnesty International and other groups to 
draw attention to the situation in Argentina, and how the topic of human rights was 
covered in the foreign press. 
My own field research conducted in Buenos Aires during August 2018, shortly 
after the 40th anniversary of the tournament, coincided with the final weeks of the 
exhibition Tiren Papelitos: Mundial 78 entre la fiesta y el horror at the Parque de la 
Memoria (National Remembrance Park), and the opening of Memorias del Mundial 78: 
una reflexión sobre deporte, DDHH y dictadura at the Archivo Nacional de la Memoria 
(National Memory Archive). The two shows offered a framework for analyses of the 
Mundial that are structured around images and material objects, drawing from the 
European boycott, government archival materials, and in the case of Tiren Papelitos, 
contemporary artworks. Both projects will figure in my closing discussion of future 
initiatives and the intersection of sport, visual culture, and human rights in Argentina. 
In terms of sporting histories, this thesis builds upon extensive histories of both 
football generally and Argentina ‘78 specifically as potent political tools. In recent years, 
scholarship on the manipulation of football and the World Cup by repressive regimes has 
flourished. I have drawn much of the history detailed herein from Jonathan Wilson’s 
Angels With Dirty Faces (2016), the latest and definitive survey of Argentinian football 
from its roots to the present day, and Matias Bauso’s 78. Historia oral del Mundial 
(2018), which attempts to reconstitute the experiential fragments of the World Cup 
through an “oral history” from present-day interviews and articles from the era. 
Argentinian journalist and attorney Pablo Llonto (2005) has meticulously documented the 
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political impulses and controversies that dotted organization of the Mundial, as well as 
the complicity of the Argentinian public in ignoring very real allegations of 
disappearances and killings.  
The social history of this thesis is derived from numerous texts dealing with the 
rule and aftermath of the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional in Argentina. Marcos 
Novaro and Vicente Palermo’s survey of the dictatorship’s six-year administration (2004) 
is exhaustive and provides a broader historical scope for analysis of the World Cup by 
detailing the dictatorship’s motives and methods. Marcelo Borrelli and Laura Oszust 
(2014) have similarly analyzed the role of Argentinian daily newspapers and magazines 
in promoting the tournament, casting them as “political actors” that largely followed the 
party line, buying into the narrative of the campaña antiargentina. My analysis is further 
informed by Italian philosopher Umberto Eco’s essay, “The World Cup and Its Pomps,” 
in which Eco directly references Argentina ‘78 and the desaparecidos. For Eco, football 
was an out—a funnel for the patriotism and anxieties of differing movements, such as the 
pro-Mundial stance taken by the Montoneros, and a veiled arena for criticism of the 
inefficient, and sinister, bureaucracy of the Argentinian dictatorship.10  
This thesis is broken into two halves: images produced and sponsored by the 
Argentinian dictatorship and its supporters, and images produced and circulated by 
European activist and solidarity movements. In chapter two, I focus on the former, 
largely consisting of the official emblems and branding materials of the Mundial, and the 
subsequent construction of nationalist megacollectives via Argentinian magazines and 
newspapers as the tournament progressed. In the third chapter, I follow with an 
                                                
10 Umberto Eco, “The World Cup and Its Pomps,” in Travels in Hyperreality: Essays (San Diego: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986): 171. 
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examination of COBA, the activation of European activist and solidarity groups, and 
imagery disseminated across major European cities, principally in France. As previously 
mentioned, I will examine how COBA’s in-house artists (and those from other 
collectives, including Amnesty International) drew upon appropriately football- and 
torture-themed iconography: heads or skulls being kicked around, the omnipresence of 
barbed wire, soldiers present in the stadiums, and so on. Yet, for their exaggerated and 
gruesome shocks, the European boycott and its political cartoons are now considered by 
Argentinian art historians and human rights scholars as a “successful failure” for pointing 
the finger at Videla’s regime and drawing global attention to the situation in Argentina, 
though still failing to force any team’s withdrawal from the tournament.11 I will analyze 
why, and what these illustrations bring (or don’t bring) to our understanding of state 
terror in 1978. 
         The fourth and concluding chapter offers a summation of the Mundial’s visual 
conflict, a brief assessment of the boycott’s lasting repercussions, and some possibilities 
as to how the asymmetrical dialogue between European and Argentinian images might be 
resolved and more closely associated with the present-day discourse surrounding human 
rights. In Argentina, the World Cup’s 40th anniversary has been recently commemorated 
through books, lectures, exhibitions, and other scholarly and artistic means. Nearly all of 
these projects have invoked the imagery of the European boycott as an indication that the 
tournament, indeed, was not all about the football. I will discuss how the rhetoric of the 
boycott continues to be persuasive in the present day, influencing these interventions as 
the Mundial’s place in the Argentinian public consciousness continues to be reassessed. I 
                                                
11 Luciana Bertoia, “El boicot al Mundial 78: un fracaso que fue todo un éxito,” in “Papelitos, 78 
historias sobre un Mundial en dictadura,” 2018. “La campaña pro-boicot fue muy eficaz a la hora de sumar 
apoyos al repudio, pese a que el campeonato se realizó con asistencia casi perfecta en la Argentina.” 
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will also briefly address recent developments in the relationship between football and 
politics, both in Argentina and internationally, and why the 1978 Mundial remains a 
pertinent, perhaps even vital, topic of study.  
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CHAPTER II 
A NATION ARRESTED 
British journalist Jonathan Wilson has argued that football in Argentina is 
“overtly political,” and that few nations invest such cultural stock in the game as the 
home of the albiceleste.12 It is difficult to argue with that notion, particularly given the 
propaganda that framed the World Cup as a pivotal struggle for moral, as well as athletic, 
superiority. Many of the tournament’s recent retrospective analyses have seized upon the 
local explosion of footballing and nationalist fervor as the Mundial became a culturally 
significant event, particularly in terms of visual and material culture.13 I will begin with 
the first wave of images and visual rhetoric from Argentina to reach a global audience 
ahead of the Mundial: graphic design and commercialized marketing materials. 
Official Emblems and the Essence of Argentinidad 
Prior to 1976, doubts had swirled around the Peronist-backed Comité de Apoyo al 
Mundial (CAM) and minister of social welfare José López Rega’s ability to develop an 
infrastructural plan of action with the World Cup looming on the horizon. Practically 
none of the costly renovations and new stadiums promised to FIFA were underway when 
the military took over organization of the event. In keeping with CAM’s organizational 
ineptitude, design historian Marta Almeida contends that designing the main marketing 
materials for the Mundial was a disjointed effort even before the sudden intervention of 
                                                
12 Jonathan Wilson, Angels With Dirty Faces: How Argentinian Soccer Defined a Nation and 
Changed the Game Forever (New York: Nation Books, 2016), xviii. Albiceleste (“sky blue and white”) is 
the nickname of Argentina’s national football team. 
  
13 See the exhibition Tiren Papelitos: Mundial 78 entre la fiesta y el horror, shown in Buenos 
Aires between June and August 2018. 
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the military and Ente Autárquico Mundial 78 (EAM) in July 1976.14 To determine the 
logo for the forthcoming tournament, the Argentinian Football Association (AFA) 
launched a contest in 1972, hoping to accrue a field of the nation’s best graphic 
designers.  
The winning design, adopted the following year, was created by Ronald 
Shakespear and Guillermo González Ruiz.15 A stylized version of Argentina’s national 
flag, the logo was comprised of 16 light blue rays, evenly divided above and below a 
central register of eight white rays; a sphere in the center stood in for the gold Sun of 
May at the heart of the flag (fig. 1). The design draws heavily from its World Cup and 
Olympic predecessors: the influences imparted by the Mexico ‘68 and Berlin ‘72 
Olympic emblems’ prominent use of negative space and curvilinear forms in their 
logotypes, particularly Otl Aicher’s central sunburst icon in the latter, are readily 
apparent (figs. 2 and 3).16 Nonetheless, the design was overly abstract, static, and 
uninspiring. Despite widespread use in official memoranda, there was little surprise when 
                                                
14 Marta Almeida, “Argentina ‘78 World Cup and the Echoes of Mexico ‘68: Internationalism and  
Latin American Design. An Intellectual History of Design in the 1960s and 1970s: Politics and Periphery,” 
(Journal of Design History 27.1, 2014) 
 
15 Bauso 504. “El 5 de mayo de 1972, Raúl D’Onofrio, interventor de la AFA, llamó a concurso 
para la creación de un emblema que identificara al Mundial 78. Resultó ganador un diseño de Ronald 
Shakespear y Guillermo González Ruiz. En el mismo acto también se eligió una mascota. El 21 de febrero 
del 73, en presencia del presidente de la FIFA, sir Stanley Rous, se hizo la presentación oficial y la entrega 
de premios. A partir de ese momento, todas las comunicaciones oficiales y de difusión del Mundial fueron 
encabezadas con el emblema elegido. Hasta que en abril de 1974 las autoridades del gobierno peronista 
decidieron cambiar estos símbolos, que quedaron olvidados. 
 
16 Aicher was a German designer associated with the Ulm Design School (HfG Ulm), whose 
faculty also included Argentinian emigre Tomás Maldonado. Almeida notes that Luis Riera, the artist 
whose design replaced the Shakespear and Gonzalez Ruiz emblem in 1974, would have keenly 
incorporated the “dynamism of the Gestalt resolution” emphasized by the school’s philosophy and 
subsequently displayed by the Munich ‘72 logo. See Almeida, “Argentina ‘78 World Cup and the Echoes 
of Mexico ‘68,” 63-64.  
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this “quickly forgotten” first version was replaced in 1974, along with a redeveloped 
vision for the tournament mascot.17 
The second Argentina ‘78 design, by Luis Riera, comprises two sweeping, sky 
blue “arms” on a white field, with a traditional black pentagon, white hexagon-patterned 
soccer ball at the center of its embrace (fig. 4). Like Shakespear and Gonzalez Ruiz’ 
version of the emblem, Riera’s design seems to borrow from preceding sporting events, 
particularly from the 1970 World Cup in Mexico and the ‘72 Summer Olympics. 
However, despite the influence of progressive international exchange, the new logo 
became an evocative symbol that could not be mistaken as belonging to any other 
tournament, except an Argentinian one. Drafted two years prior to the coup, the logo 
called back to a simple but powerful gesture: the raised arms of president Juan Domingo 
Perón (fig. 5).  
Perón was never a fan of football—he preferred fencing, boxing, and polo, among 
other sports—but he recognized that hosting a Mundial could carry tremendous “utility,” 
politically speaking; journalist Pablo Llonto notes that his vision of “a community of 
sporting men…a community of noble men,” resonated in a country so preoccupied with 
football as Argentina.18 In his third stint as president, and as his health was declining 
(eventually leading to his death in July 1974), Perón’s long-standing desire to host the 
Mundial was finally in the infant stages of its organization under the auspices of López 
Rega and Perón’s wife and soon-to-be successor Isabel. While this revised emblem 
                                                
17 Bauso 504. 
 
18 Pablo Llonto, La vergüenza de todos: el dedo en llaga del Mundial 78 (Buenos Aires: 
Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo, 2005), 13-14. “Pero a Perón no lo apasionaba el fútbol. Si bien 
recordaba su paso como entrenador de un equipo que en 1926 había obtenido el Campeonato Militar, sus 
inclinaciones deportivas apuntaban hacia la esgrima, el boxeo, la natación, el tiro, el básquetbol o el polo… 
Sin embargo en los cuarteles, incluidos los de los tiempos de Perón, siempre se habló de lo útil podía ser un 
mundial de fútbol para un gobierno.” 
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nominally came to represent “the open arms of every Argentinian,” there was no question 
that it was distinctly peronista; it was suffused not only with a national identity, but with 
the political cult of personality that Juan Domingo had shaped over decades, even while 
in exile.19 
Even before Isabel Perón was deposed, the local media was less than enthused at 
shoehorning “los brazos de Perón” into the World Cup. El Gráfico disapprovingly 
insisted in April 1974 that “a new emblem and a new mascot...means the erasure of a 
situation that has [already] been communicated to every country in the world,” and thus 
future backtracking on organizational matters could perpetuate a negative view of 
Argentina.20 But the EAM 78 was the party that found “los brazos de Perón” most 
vexing: Matias Bauso points out that this lingering trace of Perón “stung” many within 
the offices of the organizing committee, particularly its de facto president, Captain Carlos 
Lacoste. Despite lobbying for a change, however, it was already too late to wipe the slate 
clean once again. With less than two years to go before the Mundial, and with lucrative 
merchandising contracts already arranged, the EAM could do little other than issue a 
brief internal moratorium on using the logo in their own official communications. From 
1977 onwards, they grudgingly accepted their political adversary and late president of 
Argentina as the symbol of the tournament.21 
                                                
19 Llonto 13. “...fueron los brazos de Perón el logo del Mundial 78.” Perón was exiled from 
Argentina in 1955, but he and his supporters agitated for a return until 1973. 
 
20 “Editorial,” El Gráfico, 30 April 1978: “Más allá de la razón o de la sinrazón de la medida, no 
se tiene en cuenta la vinculación internacional que debe acondicionar cada cambio. Un nuevo emblema y 
una nueva mascota—lo que se pretende ahora—significan barrer con una situación que fue comunicada a 
todo los países del mundo. Aquí no es cuestión de que tal cosa se hizo en la gestión de un interventor u 
otro. Para el resto del mundo es Argentina la que hizo tal cosa.” Cited in Bauso, 504. 
 
21 Bauso 503-504. “El logo del Mundial que remedaba las manos de Perón tomando una pelota, 
gracias a esa misma alusión, producía escozor entre los miembros del EAM 78. Procuraron cambiarlo. Pero 
se encontraron con dos problemas irresolubles. Por un lado, el torneo ya era identificado con ese logo desde 
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Much like the first draft of the tournament logo, the original conception of mascot 
Mundialito appeared as an abstract, angular, and relatively austere figure that lacked little 
Argentinian character save for the colors of the national team shirt and a pair of cleats (to 
denote his status as a footballer) (fig. 6). The design was too impersonal and difficult to 
identify, and as with the official emblem, it was replaced before being made available for 
worldwide merchandising. Yet the original Mundialito’s replacement fit neatly not only 
into Argentina and FIFA’s commercial plan, but into the EAM’s propagandistic 
campaign, as well. Designed by cartoonist Manuel García Ferré, the new Mundialito is 
far more lifelike, taking the form of a young boy, and his trappings are made far more 
legible. Outfitted with a full Argentina kit (blue and white shirt, black shorts, and white 
socks), Mundialito wears a hat inscribed with “Argentina ‘78,” carries a whip, and has a 
neckerchief tied around his neck. Notable is the buoyant grin on his face, which García 
Ferré rendered with a far more dynamic flair than in the original design, along with an 
ever-present football that accompanies the boy everywhere (fig. 7).  
Mundialito, as Almeida puts it, arrived with the task of “[condensing] the identity 
of the country in a unique image for international circulation.”22 García Ferré’s refreshed 
take on the mascot just about did the job, and the decision to retain the figure’s identity as 
a gaucho was a relatively safe choice. Mundialito carried on the figure’s legacy as a 
national symbol of Argentina; real gauchos had fought against the Spanish in the 
Argentinian War of Independence, and fictional ones had been a staple of Argentinian 
                                                                                                                                            
su presentación al mundo en la clausura de Alemania 74. Pero el obstáculo mayor lo constituían los 
derechos ya vendidos para merchandising y derivados. No podían rever todos eso contratos.” 
 
22 Almeida, “Argentina ‘78 World Cup and the Echoes of Mexico ‘68,” 65.  
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literature from the late 19th century onwards, with the publication of Martin Fierro.23 
Further, anthropologist Eduardo Archetti points out, Argentinian nationalists as early as 
World War I had revived the “barbaric” subject... who had been condemned to disappear 
through immigration, hybridization, and modernization,” to forge an icon of Argentinian 
identity, in response to the perceived threat of European immigration.24 The Mundial’s 
gaucho infused these traditional conceptions of the rural revolutionary Argentinian man 
with a newfound childlike innocence, marketable both at home and abroad. This 
apolitical infantilization of the figure, Almeida argues, was functional within the military 
government’s efforts to drum up a nationalist uniformity: “concepts such as the quality of 
‘being Argentine’ and ‘childhood’ were functional within the framework of a nationalist 
and conservative fascist ideology, adding value to ethnicity (with an emphasis on 
folklore). With a subtle twist, it also used childhood to add value to ‘tradition’, 
understood as the ‘conservative and reactionary’ nucleus of totalitarian ideology.”25 
The new design was not without its critics. While El Gráfico received the change 
positively, Summa took aim at the mascot’s design in a special issue eight months before 
the tournament. The magazine remarked with frustration that “it stings because, given the 
enormous professional and technological effort needed to update the infrastructure for the 
World Cup...the image seen round the world will be the outdated one of a gaucho, and by 
                                                
23 Eduardo Archetti, “Masculinity, Primitivism, and Power: Gaucho, Tango, and the Shaping of 
Argentine National Identity,” in William French, and Katherine Elaine Bliss, eds. Gender, Sexuality, and 
Power in Latin America since Independence (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 215. 
 
24 Archetti, “Masculinity, Primitivism, and Power,” 214-215. 
 
25 Almeida, “Argentina ‘78 World Cup and the Echoes of Mexico ‘68,” 65-66. 
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extension, a child, as if we still decline to accept our condition as adults.”26 The World 
Cup’s organizational woes—not to mention Argentina’s societal ones—had left the 
country’s international image in an exceedingly delicate place for many. 
Mundialito proved to be the last major piece of design rolled out by CAM and the 
Peronist administration. Isabel Perón was deposed on March 24, 1976, with a stalling 
economy and unchecked guerrilla violence eventually signalling the death knell for her 
administration.27 Despite initial lingering trepidation over the tournament’s expenditure, 
the military junta co-opted the Mundial as a major national and international public 
relations platform between 1976 and 1978. General Videla himself knew little of, and 
expected little from, Argentina’s organization of the tournament. Among the junta, it was 
Emilio Massera and Carlos Lacoste of the navy who more keenly recognized political 
potential of a well-presented World Cup, regardless of the associated high outlay.28 From 
July 1976 onwards, when the EAM 78 replaced CAM as the local organizing committee, 
the combined armed forces of Argentina made it a matter of national interest to see out an 
immaculately executed Mundial.29  
                                                
26 “Las imágenes del Mundial.” Summa, iss. 177 (October 1977), 99: “Duelen que sean justamente 
el símbolo y la mascota, comercializadas a nivel internacional, que sean las más pobres no solo desde el 
punto de vista del mensaje sino, y sobre todo, de su nivel gráfico.” 
 
27 Novaro and Palermo 17. The authors note that, on average, a political assassination occurred in 
Argentina once every five hours during March 1976. 
 
28 Llonto 18-19. “‘Políticamente es conveniente hacer el Mundial,’ dijo Massera. Hace unos días 
antes, el almirante que soñaba con ser el nuevo Perón, había recibido un informe de uno de sus 
colaboradores más íntimos y a quien había premiado con la secretaria de Acción Social: el capitán de navío 
Carlos Lacoste. Massera leyó una tras otra las supuestas ventajas políticas y económicas que le dejaría a la 
Argentina a la XI Copa del Mundo. Videla lo escuchaba con atención, pero sin entender demasiado... 
Videla no tenía la menor idea de lo que era la FIFA ni sabia de que se trataba el “aprovechamiento integral 
de los estadios” del que hablaba la voluminosa exposición presentada por el marino. 
 
29 Bauso 77. Author Eugenio Mendez notes that the appointment of the army’s General Omar 
Actis to the presidency of the EAM irked many in the Navy, with lasting repercussions: “La designación de 
Actis cayó como un bombazo en la Armada y no era para menos. Había trabajado para quedarse con la 
organización y esta designación echaba todo por la borda.” 
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After the EAM convened and then shut down another contest to determine the 
official tournament poster, the duty of designing another key artwork for the Mundial fell 
to graphic designer and photographer Eduardo López. The poster is a highly stylized 
rendering of two Argentinian players, one with his back turned to the viewer and another 
with his arms raised to the sky, in a gesture very similar to that of the official emblem 
and, by proxy, Perón (fig. 8). At a glance, the figure with his arms raised appears to 
resemble national team forward Leopoldo Luque—complete with an abstract 
moustache—while the figure with his back turned, wearing the number eight, could 
easily pass for midfielder Osvaldo Ardiles. But the poster necessitated neither Luque nor 
Ardiles’ commitment. Tito Orsi and film producer Guillermo Szelske played those roles, 
respectively, and their resemblance, according to Szelske, was a fortunate piece of 
verisimilitude (fig. 9). For many, the poster did not feature anonymous and fictional 
Argentinians; the celebratory “Luque” and “Ardiles” pairing slyly made the dream of a 
World Cup win more tangible. It also reiterated the prospect of a truly national 
celebration, with the cities of Córdoba, Mar del Plata, Mendoza, and Rosario listed 
alongside the capital city and hub of the Mundial, Buenos Aires. 
Yet the most obvious place to begin for the junta, branding and developing a 
global visual character for the tournament ahead of the event, was precisely one area 
where the Peronist administration actually” had made significant headway.30 A complete 
redesign so soon before the tournament would have been costly and inauspicious given 
the Mundial’s already controversial organization. As such, there was not an undue 
                                                
30 Llonto 27. “Lacoste, que formaba parte del sector más antiperonista de las fuerzas armadas, 
pidió que se hiciera un esfuerzo para cambiar de logotipo, pero cuando sus asesores le informaron que entre 
los contratos firmados por el gobierno anterior estaba la comercialización del merchandising y que su 
revocatoria desembocará en un mar de juicios contra el país, prefiere masticar la derrota.” 
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amount of pressure on the EAM’s part to double down on an iconography of 
argentinidad—the quality or essence of being Argentinian—aligned with the junta’s 
vision for the country. 
Argentina Against the World: The Campaña Antiargentina 
Concerns surrounding the state of human rights in Argentina grew almost 
immediately after the March 1976 coup that unseated Isabel.31 As early as that fall, 
Amnesty International reported the widespread use of political disappearances as a main 
tactic of the new regime. With international pressure mounting, Videla’s junta finally 
agreed to host the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (CIDH) for a survey by 
September 1979. Nonetheless, the uncertainty surrounding Argentina’s fitness to host a 
global sporting event was palpable. In the wake of the coup, smooth organization of the 
World Cup was by no means a foregone conclusion, and eventually only completed with 
enormous expenditure.32  
The dictatorship’s hiring of American advertising agency Burson-Marsteller and 
Associates to counteract Videla’s negative image abroad was one of the regime’s costlier 
strategies. Between 1976 and 1980, the agency played a main, albeit fruitless, role in 
mitigating criticism from the international press and receiving foreign journalists during 
                                                
31 As Marina Franco explains, Amnesty International was among the first groups to denounce 
possible human rights violations, and between 1976 and 1978, the Argentinian junta received widespread 
admonition from the United States under the Carter administration, the United Nations, the Organización 
de Estados Americanos (OEA), and groups of exiled Argentinians, many of whom lived in Europe. See 
Franco, “La “campaña antiargentina”: la prensa, el discurso militar y la construcción de consenso,” in 
Judith Casali de Babot and María Victoria Grillo, editors. Derecha, fascismo y antifascismo en Europa y 
Argentina, (Tucumán: Universidad de Tucumán, 2002), 200. 
 
32 Estimates place the total organizational cost of the 1978 World Cup at around US$700 million, 
a controversial process that involved the construction of three new football stadiums; the installation of an 
international color television center; and significant infrastructural renovations to airports, highways and 
hotels. See Wilson 193. 
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the Mundial itself.33 Its approach to public relations found minimal success abroad, but at 
home it soon gave rise to the slogan “los argentinos somos derechos y humanos” (“We 
Argentinians are upright and humane”) (fig. 10)—a dark play on the Spanish translation 
of “human rights” (“derechos humanos”), and a direct rebuke of Amnesty International, 
the European boycott, and exiled Argentinian militants, among others.34  
Beyond the American agency’s help to cushion the blow of foreign criticism, 
however, visual and textual rhetoric disseminated via national daily newspapers and 
periodicals was an integral strategy to foster nationalist sentiment ahead of the World 
Cup. Marina Franco has argued that mobilization and coercion of the Argentinian press 
was a primary tactic in the junta’s construction of the campaña antiargentina, the foreign 
conspiracy supposedly meant to tarnish Argentina’s image on the global stage. In recent 
literature, the prominent roles of major dailies such as Clarín, along with popular, pro-
military publishing house Editorial Atlántida magazines including El Gráfico, Somos, 
Gente, and Para Tí, have been extensively discussed in terms of their adherence to the 
party line before and during the 1978 Mundial.35 Franco also points out that the 
dictatorship’s rhetoric was largely aimed at the everyday Argentinian reader as a 
                                                
33 Bauso 253. “A pesar del plan de Burson-Marsteller los notas más favorables hacia el gobierno o 
entrevistas complacientes (las únicas que estaban dispuestos a aceptar) a funcionarios argentinos no 
proliferaron en medios europeos.” 
 
34 Marta Almeida, “Temas pendientes: la Izquierda francesa y alemana frente al Campeonato 
Mundial de Fútbol Argentina 78” (Anales del Instituto de Arte Americano e Investigaciones Estéticas 
Mario J. Buschiazzo, 43.1 2013): 23. “Su eslogan más conocido fue “Los argentinos somos derechos y 
humanos”. En 1979, Burson Marsteller le dio forma a la consigna y creó un sticker adhesivo pensado, en 
especial, para automóviles. Sobre varios tamaños, la leyenda estaba escrita en un fondo celeste y blanco 
(Seoane, 2006). Tenía dos objetivos: contrarrestar las repercusiones del boicot, que habían circulado con 
fuerza el año anterior, y preparar el escenario para la visita de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos (CIDH).” 
 
35 In addition to Franco, Borrelli and Oszust, cited in this chapter, see also Mariano Verrina, “El 
periodismo deportivo durante el Mundial 78: mejor no hablar de ciertas cosas,” in “Papelitos, 78 historias 
sobre un Mundial en dictadura” (2018). 
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legitimizing measure, “a defensive discourse” that ultimately “served the construction of 
collective identification mechanisms.”36 Marcelo Borrelli and Laura Oszust similarly cast 
Editorial Atlántida’s other political and variety publications of the era, including Extra, 
Redaccion, and the aforementioned Somos, as essentially pro-military “political actors” 
whose consensus acted as a barometer for the World Cup’s success within Argentina.37 
With a highly divisive World Cup looming, the campaign “became a central and 
recurring theme in all public announcements by the representatives of the military 
government.”  
Graphic propaganda assisted written rhetoric in further essentializing the siege 
mentality narrative of the campaña and the contracampaña (counter-campaign). Images 
of a harmonious Argentinian society (and after the World Cup, images of Argentinian 
sporting supremacy) mixed with striking, sensationalist designs were used to rally the 
public to defend “the Nation.” Responding in typically brash fashion, less than two 
months before the tournament Somos reappropriated a pro-boycott illustration for its front 
cover. The original leaflet—produced by COBA in the same vein as the images we will 
see in the next chapter—featured a football casting an ominous skull-shaped shadow, 
with the caption “Argentine: terreur et répression.”38 Unwittingly, perhaps, this played 
into Somos’ hands: the magazine retained the original French text and added the headline 
                                                
36 Franco, in Casali de Babot and Grillo 202: “...si bien las denuncias provenían de foros y ámbitos 
externos como la OEA y la ONU, en buena medida el discurso defensivo del gobierno de oriento hacia 
adentro y fue uno de los mayores intentos de reconstruir legitimidades en torno al ‘Proceso’ militar. Para 
ello, el discurso se sirvió de la construcción de mecanismos de identificación colectivos, y principal, pero 
no exclusivamente, en torno al Mundial de Fútbol.” 
 
37 Marcelo Borrelli and Laura Oszust, "El Mundial 78 en la prensa política argentina: entre la 
"fiesta", el nacionalismo y los derechos humanos." Palabra 21.1 (2018): 16. 
 
38 Marta Almeida, “Temas pendientes,” 25. 
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“From Europe: A PLOT AGAINST ARGENTINA,” bolstered by an aggressive and eye-
catching red and yellow colorway (fig. 11), to sell an exposé of antiargentina sentiment. 
A subheading promised “EXORCISM: TRUTH AND LIES,” though Somos predictably 
failed to address the pertinent points of international accusations.39  
In this regard, however, it is important to recognize that condemnation from 
human rights activists, married to the production of European illustrations, sometimes 
fueled responses in kind from the Argentinian press. After the Mundial, the weekly 
variety magazine Para Tí beckoned its overwhelmingly female readership to “defend 
their Argentina,” inserting four detachable postcards into its August and September 1978 
issues that promised to “tell the whole truth” in direct response to the campaña 
antiargentina (fig. 12). The postcards included images of “everyday” life in Argentina, 
including photographs of children waving Argentinian flags in the wake of the victorious 
World Cup campaign: a callback to Mundialito and his apolitical innocence, perhaps, but 
also to a pre-Mundial television advertisement encouraging the public’s exemplary 
behavior, with Argentinian children returning a tourist’s lost passport (fig. 13).40  
Although Para Tí’s cards could be filled out and mailed abroad to any recipient of 
the reader’s choice, the magazine compiled a list of foreign persons and publications 
deemed to be aligned with the campaña antiargentina, imploring readers to mail in “a 
                                                
39 Franco explains that the “object of ‘aggression’” perceived by Argentinian periodicals 
frequently took the shape of Argentina’s “image,” rather than specific external criticisms directed at the 
Videla regime’s methods. “En estas lecturas...la clave conspirativa permite definir el quién ‘agresor’ 
situandolo fuera de las fronteras nacionales, pero el por que—su objeto de ‘agresión’—aparece sustituido: 
la violaciones a los derechos humanos, el gobierno militar, el terrorismo de estado, la represión quedan 
ocultos por ‘imagen argentina’, ‘la Nación’.” Franco, in Casali de Babot and Grillo, 208. 
 
40 The advertisement was part of a television campaign that employed children’s entertainer Carlos 
Balá and football commentator José María Muñoz, and encouraged viewers to “show [the world] what 
Argentinians are like” during the World Cup through courteous behavior. The video in question is retrieved 
from the RaroVHS (Canal 2) YouTube channel (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ztVCAXnpZSM): 
uploaded December 27, 2016; accessed March 3, 2019. 
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message that the whole world needs,” dispelling the negative rumors. These recipients 
included COBA, Amnesty International, German newspaper Der Spiegel, Spanish 
magazine Cambio 16, French newspaper Le Monde, U.S. Secretary of State Patricia 
Derian, and U.S. President Jimmy Carter; the latter two were particularly hostile to the 
Videla regime’s diplomatic intransigence over human rights.41  
A Nation Arrested  
The counter-campaign promoted by Para Tí heavily appealed to individual action, 
but in practice, the “megacollective” of Argentinian identity was the most favorable 
expression of patriotism the military government wanted. When Argentina won the 1978 
FIFA World Cup on June 25, defeating the Netherlands 3-1 in the final at the Estadio 
Monumental, joyful fans flooded the streets of Buenos Aires long into the night and in 
the following days. This was a momentary disruption of the hitherto acknowledged civil 
order imposed by the junta since 1976, which discouraged public demonstrations for the 
previous two years While Videla leaned into the massive public celebrations just a few 
days after the final, embracing his newfound and ultimately short-lived popularity42, no 
impromptu public gathering on such a scale had been seen in the two years prior, and the 
                                                
41 All of the publications and individuals targeted by Para Tí broached the issue of human rights in 
Argentina before the Mundial, while the U.S. State Department took a particularly firm stance after Carter 
assumed office. Because the names and addresses were not written in by default, Hebe de Bonafini, one of 
the founders of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo, notes that the Madres would mail the postcards abroad with 
messages about the disappearances of their loved ones, including their dates of abduction. See Bauso 248.  
 
42 Bauso 202. “Los días posteriores al Mundial, la imagen de Videla estuvo en su punto más alto. 
Algunas revistas semanales publicaban encuestas de dudosa rigurosidad en las que preguntaban a quién 
elegirían presidente en caso de poder hacerlo. Videla ganaba con comodidad, seguido por Menotti y [heart 
surgeon] René Favaloro.” 
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junta had not convened a national celebration beforehand; what Videla, Graciela Daleo, 
and others saw was done entirely of the Argentinian populace’s own volition.43  
Yet not all opinions expressed in the wake of Argentina’s first world title moved 
perfectly in sync with the needs and wants of the junta. Prior to the Mundial, Italian 
philosopher Umberto Eco theorized football and the World Cup as risk-averse substitutes 
for political debate, as football “allows you to take positions, express opinions, suggest 
solutions, without exposing yourself to arrest, to loyalty oaths, or, in any case, to 
suspicion. It doesn’t oblige you to intervene personally...”44 Though a true explosion of 
dissent remained some years away, uncertainty and an eagerness to propel the nation 
forward bubbled beneath the exuberant celebrations; the euphoria that accompanied 
Argentina’s victory was a vehicle for speculation as to what the Proceso could 
accomplish next. Days after the final, the highly popular variety magazine Somos (like El 
Gráfico and Gente, part of the pro-military Editorial Atlántida group) called for the 
World Cup’s patriotic spirit and “anti-demagoguery” to be channeled towards more 
pressing national problems, positing a “Second Mundial” that could further validate 
Videla and company’s “efficient leadership.”45  
                                                
43 Bauso 753. “Los festejos callejeros en todo el país no habían sido calculados. Se apostaba al 
orden, a dar una buena imagen al mundo. Al éxito deportivo se lo deseaba pero se lo veía lejano.” 
 
44 Making direct reference to Argentina ‘78, Eco also noted: “...at a moment like this, 
concentrating oneself with the running of the government (the real one) is traumatic. So faced with such a 
choice, we are all Argentines, and that handful of Argentine nuisances who are still reminding us that, 
down there, people are “disappeared” from time to time, should be more careful not to mar our pleasure in 
this sacred mystery play.” See Eco, “The World Cup and Its Pomps,” in Travels in Hyperreality: Essays 
(San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), 171. 
 
45 Somos, June 30, 1978. Quoted in Marcelo Borrelli and Laura Oszust, "El Mundial 78 en la 
prensa política argentina: entre la "fiesta", el nacionalismo y los derechos humanos” (Palabra 21.1, 2014), 
29: “‘La Argentina quiso y pudo hacer un Mundial de Fútbol. Deberá ahora querer y poder ganar el 
segundo Mundial, el de su futuro como país. El pueblo parece estar preparado. Falta que los líderes acepten 
el reto.’” Ostensibly, this “second Mundial” was a opportunity to ratify the vague but widely-perceived 
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The groundswell of patriotic fervor that accompanied the Mundial was 
overwhelming, but not complete. The conceit of a sweeping societal obsession with the 
Mundial—as codified by Sergio Renan’s 1979 propaganda film, La fiesta de todos, 
wherein Argentina coach Cesar Luis Menotti described his national team as being at the 
center of “un país detenido” (“a nation arrested”)46—did not quite seep into the civilian 
population’s sense of Argentinian identity or citizenship. As historians Marcos Novaro 
and Vicente Palermo explain, the Mundial momentarily legitimized the dictatorship, 
mixing footballing fanaticism and nationalism with the veneer of answering Argentinian 
society’s ills; simultaneously, the dictatorship failed to take advantage of this popular 
support, and was unable to replicate it thereafter.47  
While the very concept of “being Argentine” permeated public discourse into and 
after the World Cup, ideas on how to best express the quality of argentinidad were not 
always cohesive. In hindsight, some have disputed the sense of widespread spirit and 
camaraderie supposedly birthed from the indelible experience and imagery of Argentina’s 
World Cup win. Historian and political scientist Vicente Palermo recalls that the 
government’s advertising campaign ahead of the Mundial, imploring millions of citizens 
to “play as Argentinians” during the tournament, meant very little to him and others 
                                                                                                                                            
“extrafootballing merit” associated with Argentina’s World Cup win. See also Novaro and Palermo 166-
167. 
 
46 Sergio Renán, La fiesta de todos (Arbol Solo, 1979). Menotti, incidentally, had known 
communist affiliations prior to the Mundial, yet his narration was included at key junctures during the film. 
For more on Renán’s “disinformation” tactics in film, see Patrick T. Ridge, “La fiesta de todos o pocos? 
Representaciones fílmicas del Mundial ‘78 de la Argentina” (Studies in Latin American Popular Culture, 
vol 34, 2016), 116. 
 
47 Novaro and Palermo, in Bauso 204. “Marcos Novaro: Todo el fervor que hubo con el tema del 
Mundial es naturalmente parte de esa mezcla de fútbol y nacionalismo pero también había una sensación de 
que la dictadura finalmente estaba teniendo éxito, de que era legítima y prestigiosa para la sociedad, que 
daba soluciones a los problemas y entonces el que no se subiera a ese carro se iba a quedar afuera del mapa. 
Vicente Palermo: Creo que fue el clímax del Proceso. El mejor momento que aprovecharon mal.” 
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despite the institutional saturation of the airwaves with this nationalist rhetoric.48 Artist 
Julio Flores, too, who helped organize the Siluetazo artistic action and protest in 1983, 
has pointed out the “uncomfortable collective expression of symbols appropriated by the 
‘78 Mundial,” all of which were quintessentially or stereotypically Argentinian: “the 
gaucho, the flag, soccer.”49 Uncomfortable or not, however, the most significant aspect of 
state-sponsored Argentinian sporting fanaticism in 1978 was precisely its visibility in 
everyday society, which facilitated the Mundial as a useful distraction from ongoing 
clandestine horrors.  
                                                
48 Bauso 194. “Campaña oficial (mayo de 1978): El Mundial también es confraternidad, y usted 
juega de argentino. Vicente Palermo, politólogo: El gobierno podía decir cualquier cosa, hacer la 
propaganda institucional que quisiera y a mi no me dice nada. Una cosa como la de “jugar de argentinos” 
en ese momento me hinchaba las pelotas. Y a mucha gente no le decía absolutamente nada.” 
 
49 Julio Flores, “Siluetas,” in El Siluetazo, compiled by Ana Longoni and Gustavo A. Bruzzone 
(Buenos Aires: Ana Hidalgo, editor, 2008), 85. “Pero a los gritos–silenciados desde el ‘75 (el silencio es 
salud)–les siguió el silencio sepulcral que reprimía la palabra propia, la imagen que identifica o la música, 
representada por la incómoda expresión colectiva de los símbolos apropiados por el Mundial ‘78 (el 
gaucho, la bandera, el fútbol).”  
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CHAPTER III 
NO TO FOOTBALL IN CONCENTRATION CAMPS! 
 
On October 19, 1977, the French newspaper Le Monde published an open letter 
by writer and activist Marek Halter denouncing the climate of political violence in 
Argentina. Halter’s appeal was deeply rooted in family tragedy: in July, his cousin Ana 
Maria Kumec de Isola and her husband, Mario, had been disappeared and killed by 
Argentinian security forces. Ana Maria’s family was Jewish and had escaped the Nazis, 
only to befall the same fascist brutality.50 To Halter, the least he and his countrymen 
could do was turn their backs on the Argentinian dictatorship’s principal bulwark of 
legitimacy: the Mundial. A boycott was the only moral choice. “If we do not win this 
battle,” he warned, “barbarity will prevail.”51   
Halter’s letter, along with a column dated December 13, 1977 by L’Equipe sports 
writer Jacques Ferran, thrust the subject of a boycott into the mainstream of French 
current affairs.52 Between October 1977 and April 1978 France became a principal hub 
for public anti-Mundial protests, opinion pieces, debates, and, of course, graphic 
materials.53 The end of the year saw the foundation of COBA: the Committee for the 
                                                
50 Marek Halter, “Pour lutter contre la barbarie,” in Le Monde, 19 October 1977. “Ma famille 
n'aura pas eu à attendre très longtemps: les corps de ma cousine Anne-Marie et de son mari Mario Isola 
viennent d'être devant domicile de leurs parents. Ils avaient été anievas il, y a six semaines. Laissant 
derrière eux un enfant de onze mois. Fallait-il qu'un descendants de rares membre de sa famille rescapés du 
nazisme disparaisse ainsi?” In 2018, Ana Maria’s story was retold by her brother Carlos Kumec, at a 
roundtable discussion hosted at AMIA (Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina). 
 
51 Halter, “Pour lutter contre la barbarie.” 
  
52 Jacques Ferran, “En toute liberte: jouer en Argentine,” in L’Equipe, 13 December 1977. 
 
53 Almeida, “Temas pendientes,” 25. “La campaña francesa y sus contundentes imágenes pronto 
llegaron a las asociaciones de defensa de los derechos humanos. Antes, durante y después de junio de 1978, 
el COBA organizó actividades para recaudar fondos e imprimir calcomanías, folletos y afiches de repudio.” 
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Boycott of the Organization of the World Cup in Argentina, founded by human rights 
activist François Gèze, and primarily comprised of French left-wing intellectuals.54 The 
group convened for the first time in January, headquartered at 14 Rue Nanteuil in Paris, 
and began reaching out to solidarity groups and left-wing activists across the continent in 
the hopes of drafting an action plan by late February.55  
This chapter focuses on the prodigious output of graphic materials by 
organizations opposed to the Argentinian dictatorship’s organization of the World Cup. 
The effort to boycott the tournament was a truly multinational affair. COBA and its 
French affiliates lead the charge in denouncing the state of repression in Argentina from 
January 1978 onwards, accounting for a vast portion of the graphic and written materials 
on the matter, but arguments were already being made in Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden (among other nations) as to the feasibility of withdrawing each nation’s 
respective national football team from the event.56 As a result, the images I will analyze 
in the following sections come from a variety of European collectives and solidarity 
movements, linked by common tropes and universal strategies of representation that 
called attention to the atrocities in Argentina. COBA-produced and appropriate materials 
                                                
54 Bauso 212. 
 
55 A communication dated February 1978 reveals that COBA’s executive committee invited 
solidarity groups from France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Catalunya, Sweden, 
Norway, and Denmark for a conference to be held in Paris, on February 25 & 26 of that year. The purpose 
of the conference, according to the letter, was twofold: “1) Exchange of information and 2) harmonization 
and coordination of [various] efforts and campaigns,” opening the door to the possible adoption of a unified 
rhetoric countering the Mundial in Argentina.  
 
56 The Swedish Football Association, in particular, came under the most scrutiny for resolving to 
appear at the World Cup. The disappearance (and eventual murder) of 17-year old Dagmar Hagelin, an 
Argentinian national of Swedish ancestry, and the Swedish government's subsequent international appeals 
to determine her whereabouts was a major diplomatic issue between 1977 and 1978. Hagelin’s 
disappearance, and the repressive situation in Argentina at large, provoked consternation among Swedish 
football officials. Eventually, however, the national team participated in the Mundial as planned. See Bauso 
222. 
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are among the most numerous in this chapter, but I will also highlight select illustrations 
disseminated by Amnesty International, the West German group Zille-Kollektiv, and 
SKAN (Argentina-Netherlands Solidarity Collective) to reinforce the argument of a 
shared European iconography in response to Argentinian totalitarianism.  
In the following section, I will focus on common strategies of subverting the 
official branding materials of the tournament, as described in the second chapter. I follow 
with an examination of the generalized methods of rendering political detention, torture, 
and grievous bodily harm, particularly among images sponsored by COBA, and how 
these stereotypes illustrate the distance between activist movements in Europe and the 
totality of the situation in Argentina. This chapter closes with an extensive discussion of 
the boycott’s heavy reliance on imagery derived from the Holocaust and World War II, 
and how this familiar imagery may have facilitated reception and awareness among 
European audiences, despite being at odds with the Argentinian reality.  
Yes to Football, No to Torture: Subversions of Official Imagery 
Several images that originated from the boycott reappropriated the official 
marketing materials of the World Cup. Luis Riera’s “brazos de Perón” emblem (and to a 
lesser extent, the mascot Mundialito) became a recurring point of reference in these 
illustrations, often given a brutal or gruesome twist to underscore the dire situation faced 
by Argentinians who had run afoul of the military regime. 
Among the most iconic images to emerge from the French sector of the boycott 
was COBA’s “Pas de football entre les camps de concentration” (“No to football in 
concentration camps!”), applying a crucial twist to Riera’s sweeping arms. Here, the 
motif is repeated over and over, on both sides of the image. They are no longer arms that 
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close in a joyful and uplifting embrace, but twelve posts in a prison camp fence, 
connected by razor wire; the Argentina ‘78 logo appears in full at the center of the image, 
integrated into this architecture and receding into the background. (fig. 14). Is the 
Mundial an escape from the horrors experienced by the desaparecidos and other political 
prisoners, or is it an entrance to them? The implications are ambiguous, but what is 
certain is that the image conveys an overriding sense of claustrophobia. The literal 
elaboration of prison-like space is oppressive: the narrow corridor that cuts through the 
center of the illustration, flanked by tall barbed fences, unequivocally links the Mundial 
with detention and extermination. 
“Pas de football entre les camps de concentration” remains of the most significant 
images produced by COBA’s artists, and certainly one that has come to symbolize the 
boycott in contemporary Argentinian human rights discourse. Argentina’s self-stylization 
as a conservative, morally upright, Judeo-Christian society57—the nation-making conceit 
later sloganized as “los argentinos somos derechos y humanos”—belied the Proceso’s 
systematic extirpation of the left after assuming power in 1976.58 In response, “Pas de 
football entre les camps de concentration” leads with the most inhumane association 
                                                
57 Novaro and Palermo 93. “El integrismo argentino bien puede denominarse… “nacional-
catolicismo” ya que identificaba a esta fe como la “ideológica nacional” y postulaba una “alianza 
permanente entre Religión y Patria. Ello compelía al Ejército, en tanto institución madre de la nación, a 
cumplir un papel decisivo en la tarea de regeneración moral que permitiría a la Argentina y a todo 
Occidente no solo combatir al comunismo, sino también las causas de sua avance; esto es, las decadentes 
concepciones liberales, democráticas y agnósticas.” 
 
58 Almeida, “Temas pendientes,” 23. “...por el otro, aquellos medios que propalaban la versión de 
la dictadura inspirados en la publicidad de la agencia Burson Marsteller & Asociados, de los Estados 
Unidos, contratada por la Junta Militar. Su eslogan más conocido fue “Los argentinos somos derechos y 
humanos”. En 1979, Burson Marsteller le dio forma a la consigna y creó un sticker adhesivo pensado, en 
especial, para automóviles. Sobre varios tamaños, la leyenda estaba escrita en un fondo celeste y blanco. 
Tenía dos objetivos: contrarrestar las repercusiones del boicot, que habían circulado con fuerza el año 
anterior, y preparar el escenario para la visita de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos 
(CIDH).” 
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possible: Argentinian conservatism is linked with German fascism, and the latter’s use of 
the extermination camp as a machine of state terror. This suggestion, perhaps, is the 
image’s (and the boycott’s) greatest persuasive strategy: though a layer of political 
context is lost considering the official emblem’s Peronist origins, it expressly denies any 
condition of morality, stability, or normalcy as applied to the Mundial, all of which could 
be connoted by the celebratory arms.  
Consequently, the Argentina ‘78 logo remained a popular target for subversion: a 
means of instantly identifying a perverse dimension of the event, and rallying a call to 
action in European cities. One anonymously-produced flier from Dortmund, West 
Germany, augmented the official emblem by again keenly employing razor wire; while 
the sweeping arms still grasp a football in their embrace, they are constricted by barbed 
handcuffs. The image is given a stark black and white colorway, with the emblem 
appearing on a white, rounded rectangle not unlike a television screen. (fig. 15) Though 
made by an anonymous designer—indeed, many of the artists responsible for creating 
images such as these remain unknown59—the flier was an advertisement for an 
informational session in Dortmund, which took place on March 10, 1978. The caption, 
borrowed from Amnesty International’s own anti-Mundial campaign, inextricably links 
organization of the tournament with human rights abuses: “ARGENTINA 78: Fußball 
Ja—Folter Nein!” (“Yes to football—No to torture!”)60 The information listed beneath 
particularly speaks to the network of solidarity and activist movements that rallied around 
the topic of the Mundial; beyond the eye-catching design, the flier advertises that 
                                                
59 Almeida, “Temas pendientes,” 32. “Muchos de los autores del boicot europeo fueron anónimos, 
como los de Argentina 78: Fußball Ja – Folter Nein!” 
 
60 For Amnesty International’s use of the slogan, see Alfredo Relaño, “Polémica internacional en 
torno al Mundial de Fútbol,” in El País, March 31, 1978. 
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Argentinians (presumably exiled Argentinian militants, though Marina Franco notes few 
were directly involved with the European boycott) would seemingly “report on the 
situation in Argentina” (“Argentinian berichten über die lage in Argentinien!”), along 
with a presentation on the topic of football and torture.  
The motif of the sweeping arms restricted by handcuffs or composed of razor wire 
was continually used to evocative effect. An image designed by the left-wing Zille-
Kollektiv’s artists early in 1978 reduced the arms to twisted lengths of wire, substituting 
a human skull for the football at the center of the image. A triangular gallows, with three 
hanging figures, replaces the “A” in Argentina ‘78 (fig. 16). The same formula (minus 
the hangman’s scaffold) appears in an image circulated by the Den Haag-based group 
SKAN, with the skull rendered somewhat abstractly to mimic the use of negative space in 
Riera’s original emblem (fig. 17). As if to amplify the macabre connotations of the 
image, the skull smiles back at the viewer with a wide and twisted grin, threatening to 
escape the arms’ restrictive embrace. The stark black-on-white graphic is accompanied 
by the caption “Argentina ‘78: VOETBAL en FOLTERLING” (“Football and torture”) in 
bold typeface, and a series of three phrases repeated through the background pattern of 
the image: “Politieke gevangenen, vermisten, koncentratie kampen” (“Political prisoners, 
disappeared, concentration camps”). 
As we will see later in this chapter, the associations with camps and 
disappearances were designed to be anything but subtle. However, the simple and 
consistent act of subverting Perón’s gesture is a compelling twist, an example of the 
artistic sleight of hand required to make the imagery of the boycott resonate with viewers. 
The multifaceted gesture seen in the original emblem—an icon of Perón’s legacy and his 
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short-lived return; an uplifting and joyful embrace associated with the Argentinian flag 
and people; a heavily commercialized symbol of victory—loses any semblance of 
positive affect and innocence, replaced with increasingly visceral and violent 
connotations.  
To this end, the mascot Mundialito underwent similar transformations in the 
hands of artists opposed to the dictatorship. When rendered by European political 
cartoonists, Mundialito retained the original cartoon’s football kit and gaucho 
accessories, with a thematic emphasis placed upon the barbarity of allowing the Mundial 
to proceed in such conditions.  an image published as a part of the 1978 collection La 
Coupe déborde, Videla! (The Cup Overflows, Videla!), a compilation of 56 individual 
political cartoons by 56 illustrators, features Mundialito gleefully and forcefully kicking a 
globe (fig. 18). The illustration was created by French political cartoonist Jean Plantureux 
(Plantu), and it turns the boyish charm of the mascot on its head. The innocent grin on 
Mundialito’s face becomes sinister, and blood erupts from Argentina—indeed, all of 
South America—where the globe has been struck, spilling out onto the ground. Plantu 
renders Mundialito twice on the same page, and literally draws an arrow from a small-
scale version of the original mascot to the new, violent gaucho boy. The implications of 
the image are clear: the 1978 World Cup was not only a distraction from violent acts 
against Argentinians, but a violent act towards Argentina in and of itself, and a moral 
affront to the rest of the world. 
At this juncture, however, it might be pertinent to recognize that the visual 
strategy of reappropriating the Mundial’s official emblems was an independently adopted 
activist strategy carried out simultaneously in Argentina and in Europe, albeit to different 
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ends. While they are not the primary focus of this paper, it is worth briefly pointing out 
briefly that brochures and posters circulated by the left-wing Movimiento Peronista 
Montoneros (MPM) co-opted the World Cup’s official imagery to the promote their own 
insurgent campaign. These illustrations were less reliant on depictions of physical trauma 
than their French counterparts, though heavily informed by Argentina’s recent and 
bloody political past: prior to the Mundial, the MPM had been nearly decimated by the 
military’s counter-subversive operations, aimed at killing off all militant political 
opposition.61 Many of the surviving Montoneros opted for exile in Europe; those that 
stayed in Argentina continued to execute small-scale underground operations, not only 
with firearms, but with political rhetoric furtively disseminated in the streets via 
brochures, pamphlets, and graffiti.62  
The Montoneros re-drew Mundialito with explicitly rural dress, usually replacing 
the Argentina shirt and gaucho hat used in the official FIFA-sponsored image with a 
poncho and a blue-and-white headband, though he always retained his football boots (fig. 
19). The Gauchito Montonero was part of the groups’ pro-Mundial, anti-dictatorship, 
anti-Videla campaign, which supported the carnival atmosphere and patriotic pride that 
                                                
61 The military’s strategy of cracking down on “terrorist” and left-wing operations in Argentina 
was infamously summarized by General Iberico Saint-Jean in 1977 as the following: “Primero vamos a 
matar a todos los subversivos, después a sus colaboradores; después a los indiferentes y por último a los 
tímidos.” (“First we will kill all the subversives, then their collaborators; afterwards, those that are 
indifferent, and finally, the timid.”) See “Murió Saint Jean, el que quería matar a todos,” in Página/12, 
October 6, 2012: <https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/ultimas/20-205033-2012-10-06.html> 
 
62 Sagaian, “Los panfletos de Montoneros durante el Mundial 78: La resistencia silenciosa.” 
“Pegatinas en los baños, en estaciones de trenes, pintadas en algunas paredes ocultas de noche y 
volanteadas sorpresivas fueron algunas de las acciones recurrentes. Las condiciones que imponía la 
dictadura hacían que cada actividad, por mínima que fuera, se transformara en una operación militar… En 
otros casos la operación tenía otra dinámica: se dejaba una caja con un sistema de resorte accionado por 
reloj con temporizador que tiraba volantes por el aire, o se arrojaban panfletos desde alguna moto o un auto 
en centros comerciales, plazas o en los alrededores de los estadios y lugares con una gran congregación de 
gente.” 
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accompanied the tournament, but condemned the brutality of the Videla regime through 
slogans such as “Este partido lo gana el pueblo” (“This game will be won by the people”) 
and “Argentina campeon, Videla al paredon!” (“Argentina champions, Videla to the 
wall!”). He could rightly be seen could be seen as a reclamation of the rural identities 
erased by the FIFA- and EAM-marketed mascot, especially as he carries a Tacuara spear, 
in reference to the gaucho Montoneras that fought in Argentina’s war for independence.63 
The Montoneros’ militant struggle turned clandestine after 1976, under the 
constraints of extreme censorship and the ever-looming threat of murder, and thus their 
propagandistic campaign took place in a vastly different context to the relative freedom 
of protest exercised in the European nations where the boycott flourished.64 Nevertheless, 
the points of confluence between COBA and MPM’s images may help to illustrate the 
primary concerns addressed by European artists in response to the Mundial. As I will 
outline in the following pages, the urgencies conveyed by images of the boycott dealt less 
with Argentina’s systematic sociopolitical traumas, and more with the imagined horrors 
inflicted on the desaparecidos. 
“The Labor of Justice”: Rumors and Ruinous Injuries in COBA’s Publications 
                                                
63 Sagaian, “La resistencia silenciosa.” “Los textos denunciaban la situación político-social del 
país y se contagiaban del clima mundialista que se vivía en las calles. “Argentina campeón, Videla al 
paredón”, “Este partido lo gana el pueblo”, “Argentina 78, dictadura 0”, “Resistir es vencer” eran algunas 
de las consignas que se leían en aquellos papelitos de dos por tres, que llevaban el logo del Mundial y la 
imagen del “Gauchito Montonero”, una réplica de la mascota oficial de Argentina que iba vestido con un 
poncho y una lanza Tacuara.” 
 
64 Sagaian, “La resistencia silenciosa.” “La conducción de Montoneros había fijado para 1978 una 
política que implicaba la realización de acciones armadas y de propaganda de tal trascendencia que la 
dictadura militar no las pudiera ocultar. El reparto de panfletos, folletos, el envío de cartas fueron parte de 
esa estrategia que requirió un trabajo de hormiga y, claro, un impacto mucho menor que las bombas en las 
casas de generales.”  
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Violence, torture, and irreparable injury to the body were overwhelmingly 
pervasive visual tropes used in the images that featured human subjects, particularly 
those circulated by COBA. When the committee published La Coupe déborde, Videla! in 
the spring of 1978, nearly every artwork included in the book featured extremely graphic 
representations of torture. Mutilation, death by firing squad, football players using 
severed human heads as a ball, prisoners tied to posts as “shooting practice,” and torturers 
that delight in watching football while on the job were all present.  
By 1978, rumors of the Argentinian dictatorship’s repressive tactics had spiked 
sharply, aided by the resolute and increasingly reported efforts of the Madres de Plaza de 
Mayo.65 However, the rate of desapariciones in the country was beginning to fall after 
reaching all-time highs during 1976 and 1977.66 Beyond the experiences of exiled 
Argentinians living abroad and a lingering suspicion of ongoing activities at the Escuela 
Mecánica de la Armada, there was painfully little information that could attest to the 
scope of state terror in Argentina. Videla and company were infamously tight-lipped on 
the matter of political detentions without due process, and deflected any mention of the 
desaparecidos by default, eventually arguing that they “did not exist” and had no rights.67 
                                                
65 Franco, “Derechos humanos, política y fútbol,” 29. “Si la represión en Argentina era 
mundialmente denunciada desde 1976, el “fenómeno” de los “desaparecidos” –y con ello las Madres de 
Plaza de Mayo– recién comenzaba a ser masivamente conocido fuera del país. En 1978, en Europa el 
conocimiento del tema estaba bastante limitado a los grupos políticos o intelectuales más sensibles a la 
política internacional.” 
 
66 Novaro and Palermo 119. “Hacia mediados de 1978, la mayor parte del trabajo había sido 
hecho. No las organizaciones guerrilleras y su periferia, sino también los partidos y grupos de izquierda 
revolucionaria, las comisiones y los delegados sindicales combativos y las agrupaciones estudiantiles 
habían sido diezmados… La desactivación de los centros siguió en la segunda mitad de 1978 y, hacia 
comienzos de 1979, tan sólo siete de ellos continuaban operando; ya muy pocos secuestrados seguían con 
vida (el número de secuestros disminuyó también sensiblemente: la CONADEP registró 137 casos durante 
todo ese año y 58 en el siguiente).”  
 
67 During a press conference in 1979, Videla declared on national television: “I’ll tell you that the 
disappeared, as long as they are such, are an unknown, as long as they are disappeared they cannot receive 
 
 37 
To fill the gap, COBA’s artists illustrated all manner of grotesque ordeals: some 
metaphorical, but others distinctly plausible, despite the creative license. One artwork, by 
an illustrator named Lesueur, makes a direct reference to the possibility of abuse and 
detention at ESMA: as a torturer watches a game on television, celebrating just as a goal 
flies in—“Et paf! Deux zero!” (“Wham! Two-zero!”)—a bloodied victim lies strapped to 
the table. In the background sits an anatomical chart labeled Escuela de Mecánica, 
leaving no doubt as to whether the officer has applied his fullest knowledge of the human 
body (fig. 20). 
ESMA was Argentina’s darkest open secret: it had begun operations as a 
clandestine prison in 1975, as Isabel Perón’s administration struggled to curb the spread 
of guerrilla violence in urban centers.68 More than 5,000 detainees passed through the 
notorious centro clandestino de detención (clandestine detention center, or CCD) 
between 1976 and 1983, the overwhelming majority of them tortured and murdered.69 
However, references to localized and specific human rights abuses, as well as real sites of 
torture, are otherwise absent from La Coupe déborde, Videla! The rest of the book is an 
exercise in illustrating generalized forms of torture, by no means outlandish, but 
undoubtedly generic; throughout, there is a lack of regard to the identities of the victims. 
Some of the unfortunate detainees in these images are identified as journalists, but there 
                                                                                                                                            
special treatment because they have no entity. They are not dead or alive...they are missing.” (“Le diré que 
frente al desaparecido en tanto éste como tal, es una incógnita, mientras sea desaparecido no puede tener 
tratamiento especial, porque no tiene entidad. No está muerto ni vivo...está desaparecido.”) See “Videla en 
1979: No está muerto ni vivo... está desaparecido,” in La Voz, May 17, 2013. 
 
68 Novaro and Palermo 118. “Estos centros [ESMA, La Perla, Campo de Mayo, Club Atlético, and 
Vesubio, all clandestine prisons] compartieron el privilegio de haber iniciado sus actividades antes del 
golpe militar, a fines de 1975, y de contrarse entre los últimos en dejar de operar.”  
 
69 Federico Rivas Molina, “El centro de torturas icono de la dictadura argentina será la sede del 
ministerio de Justicia,” in El País, July 26, 2017. 
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is a lack of clarification as to who these prisoners are supposed to be: they are not 
militants, students, intellectuals, or subversives, simply innocents. 
And then there is the total and conspicuous erasure of women who might be at 
risk in the dystopian host nation. Not a single victim illustrated in this collection is 
female—not even nondescript, as male victims are often rendered—save for one. The 
only female figure with any kind of centrality in La Coupe déborde, Videla! is a 
grotesque image of Lady Justice. She retains her blindfold, sword, and scale, but she has 
been stripped of her robes and, contorted backwards, gives birth to a skull (fig. 21). The 
caption laments “the labor of justice” in allowing the Mundial to proceed. But this 
gruesome illustration is the extent of women’s involvement or suffering depicted in the 
book, and their absence completely overlooks a significant portion of the state violence 
enacted by the Proceso.  
Forty years on, the absence of women in these images of torture and detention 
seems puzzling. If Argentinian women made up for a significant slice of prisoner intake 
at CCDs, why were those inherently gendered experiences of state terror—“extreme 
situations of bodily vulnerability and destruction” that included rape and physical 
beatings of pregnant detainees, for example70—not accepted as a possibility when COBA 
and their contemporaries visually highlighted the existence of human rights violations? 
Their absence in La Coupe déborde, Videla! despite dozens of images on the subject of 
football and repression is a notable omission, although Barbara Sutton has pointed out the 
longstanding tendency both inside and outside Argentina to focus on maternal figures, 
such as the Madres and Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, and their losses at the hands of the 
                                                
70 Barbara Sutton. Surviving State Terror: Women’s Testimonies of Repression and Resistance 
(New York: NYU Press, 2018): 136 
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military government.71 The artists of the European boycott, however, left behind 
Argentina’s contemporary traumas in search of a catastrophe decidedly more well-known 
among their audiences. 
The Specters of Berlin: Videla, Hitler, and the Reception of Holocaust Imagery         
The boycott’s endgame, as described in retrospect by its founders, was never 
upsetting the apple cart to such a degree that several participating nations would 
withdraw from the World Cup, despite the slim possibility of success.72 Though this 
assertion carries an air of historical revisionism, there is no doubt that the boycott was 
especially effective at popularizing—or reviving—the notion that totalitarianism was 
alive and well, and that the Videla regime posed an existential threat to human liberties, 
even if said threat was found in an oft-overlooked nation across the Atlantic. 
Though the West German branch of Amnesty International and its “Yes to 
football—No to torture!” campaign (fig. 22) gained a moderate amount of publicity, with 
the organization estimating that some 8,000 people had been detained without due 
process by the Videla regime, COBA and its French affiliates were largely responsible 
for thrusting the topic of football and repression into the public eye.73 Between January 
and May 1978, they saturated coverage of the Mundial with press conferences, posters, 
                                                
71 Sutton 15-16. See also Laura Malosetti Costa, “Memory Work in Argentina 1976-2006,” in 
Griselda Pollock and Max Silverman, eds. Concentrationary Memories: Totalitarian Terror and Cultural 
Resistance (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2014), 225. 
 
72 Franco, in Bauso 214: “Marina Franco: Es difícil responder si el boicot tuvo posibilidades de 
éxito, medir lo que no sucedió. Sin embargo, la discusión era real.” See also excerpts from Bauso’s 
interview with Marek Halter, in Bauso 215.  
73 Luciana Bertoia, “El boicot al Mundial 78: Un fracaso que fue todo un éxito.” “Según Amnesty, 
la publicidad es la peor enemiga de la tortura. Por eso, solicitaba a todos los que fueran a asistir que 
indagaran sobre lo que sucedía en la Argentina y que después lo difundieran. Como explica Silvina Jensen 
en su libro Los exiliados, la organización denunciaba entonces que habían 15 mil desaparecidos y 8000 
presos.” See also Franco, “Derechos humanos, política y fútbol,” 30. 
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informational brochures and booklets, and community outreach session.74 Much of the 
sudden spike in local awareness can be attributed to the L’Epique newsletter, an imitation 
of the popular sports daily L’Equipe. COBA’s take on the format particularly emphasized 
topics of human rights, sport and politics, and the debate surrounding boycotts of 
repressive regimes, including the ‘78 Mundial and the 1980 Summer Olympics in 
Moscow, and it frequently played host to political images in service of the boycott.75 
L’Epique found an unexpectedly wide readership, and by the beginning of the Mundial 
over 120,000 copies had been sold.76 
Nonetheless, artists working in service of the boycott in both France and West 
Germany were stymied by the scarcity of solid information from Argentina. 
Subsequently, they turned to the most tangible atrocity that lingered in living memory: 
the Holocaust. In Europe, the lessons learned from the Nazi regime, its manipulation of 
sport, and the continental genocide were not forgotten lightly. Almeida suggests that 
because the uninterrupted rise of fascism and Nazism loomed large on the continent’s 
“political horizon” post-war, artists of the pro-boycott groups “recycled themes from the 
imaginary created by the two great conflicts,” appealing to their own past and imploring 
their compatriots and neighbors not to let the same mistake happen again.77  
                                                
74 Marina Franco, “Derechos humanos, política y fútbol,” (Entrepasados XIV 28, 2005): 29. 
 
75 “Argentina 78: Le massacre continue...place au foot!” in L’Epique n°4, June 1978 (Paris: 
Comité de Boycott du Mondial de Football en Argentine), front page.  
 
76 Franco, “Derechos humanos, política y fútbol,” 29. 
 
77 Almeida, “Temas pendientes,” 26. “Una primera cuestión debe estar vinculada, necesariamente, 
con el contexto histórico europeo. Luego de 1948, el fascismo y el nazismo formaban parte del horizonte 
político: la izquierda europea ya había tenido que lidiar contra la violencia de Estado y el autoritarismo. Las 
imágenes del boicot francés y la denuncia alemana apelaron, precisamente, a su propio pasado, reciclando 
temas del imaginario dejado por las dos grandes guerras para construir un discurso nuevo, esta vez, contra 
una dictadura latinoamericana.” Intriguingly, however, the memories of World War II proved more 
relevant, although the horrors of World War I nominally lingered in the European imaginary. 
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This section focuses on the development and reception of a shared European 
iconography of totalitarianism. The anti-Mundial imagery that sprung from France and 
West Germany, in particular, leaned heavily on distinct tropes: first, the militant cult of 
personality surrounding dictators (particularly in depictions of Adolf Hitler and Jorge 
Rafael Videla); and second, the Holocaust-informed conception that state terror equaled 
concentration camps, plus the architecture that comprised them. These stereotypes carried 
explicit associations with Nazism and the atrocities of World War II. Despite the 
inaccuracies vis-a-vis the reality of state terror in Argentina, these images may have had a 
highly persuasive effect in terms of drawing attention to the junta’s manipulation of the 
Mundial.  
Given the boycott’s explicit denunciation of the junta’s fascist tendencies as far 
back as Marek Halter’s letter in October 1977, it is no surprise that General Videla 
became one of the most heavily satirized figures as the movement’s graphic output 
accelerated, increasingly compared to the Nazi leader. It was Videla who would 
eventually deliver the opening address of the 1978 World Cup under a darkly ironic “sign 
of peace,” and it was Videla who would eventually occupy the role of the junta’s “fourth 
man,” officially taking on the mantle as the President of Argentina in 1981. The military 
man from Mercedes was the foremost face of the junta, and both at home and abroad, the 
Mundial arguably came to be known as Videla’s Mundial.78 
One of the earliest images of note disseminated by COBA was not produced in-
house, but reproduced from the Spanish current affairs magazine Cambio 16, which 
                                                                                                                                            
 
78 Bauso 204.  
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routinely covered news of the boycott.79 The political cartoon by illustrator Enrique 
Ortega, titled “Hitler 36, Videla 78; or sport in service of political propaganda,” set the 
tone for most of the imagery that advocated for the European boycott. The image takes 
the fascist parallels between Nazi Germany and Proceso Argentina literally, with Adolf 
Hitler standing on a podium and performing the Nazi salute. Jorge Rafael Videla kneels 
next to him, but unlike Hitler he is not dressed in ceremonial military attire—instead, the 
general wears Argentina’s traditional striped football kit and cleats. (fig. 23) Ortega’s 
illustration is powerful, and it cuts directly to the heart of the most pressing question 
posed by COBA: who is ultimately the winner when sport is allowed to legitimize an 
authoritarian regime? 
Both dictators are rendered with outrageously large heads and exaggerated facial 
features, but the differences in their representation are telling. Hitler is at the top of the 
hierarchy as the first offender and, reasonably, the worst: the podium and the cartoon’s 
caption are both references to the 1936 Summer Olympics in Berlin. Videla’s pose is 
reminiscent of a footballer’s during a pre-match photograph, but it is difficult to argue 
that he is the main focus of the image, despite Argentina ’78 being the pertinent issue. 
Ortega’s choice of uniform for both caricatures, too, is conscious. While Hitler wears his 
chancellor’s uniform and Nazi medal, perhaps an allusion to Germany’s prioritization of 
military expansion throughout the 1930s and 40s, the Argentinian general is given neither 
his military regalia nor the crisp suit that he increasingly came to wear during the latter 
part of the decade. We might infer that the albiceleste shirt represents Videla’s form of 
nationalism: after all, most of his and the junta’s bets were placed on the impeccable 
                                                
79 Cambio 16’s journalists were banned from the Mundial due to their perceived negative coverage 
of the military junta, and the magazine was also one of the foreign publications targeted by Para Tí in its 
post-Mundial “Defienda su Argentina” postcard campaign. See Bertoia, “El boicot al Mundial 78.” 
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execution of the Mundial, the exemplary behavior of the Argentinian fans and public, and 
finally, the success of the national team.80 A week before the tournament, Videla invited 
Argentina’s 22-man squad to the Casa Rosada (the Argentinian presidential palace). 
Likening himself to a commander addressing his troops, he urged Cesar Luis Menotti’s 
players to preserve the “nobility” of the Argentinian man and the “humane quality” of 
Argentinians at large through their comportment on the field.81   
 Other political cartoons continued to mock Videla as a pale, though still 
manipulative and cruel, imitation of Adolf Hitler. The aforementioned La Coupe 
déborde, Videla! featured the general not only in its title but in a number of the cartoons 
contained therein. The cover image, unsigned by its artist, features a grim visage of 
Videla who is yet again rendered with a large head and highly exaggerated facial 
features, and a lip-curling sneer (fig. 24). The general wears his ceremonial military cap 
in this illustration, but a pair of pliers (in the form of a brooch) replaces the customary 
Argentinian coat of arms, accompanied by a small pin taking the shape of a skull. Videla 
is otherwise outfitted in a dark football kit emblazoned with a “78” patch on the left 
breast. As in Enrique Ortega’s earlier image, Videla carries a football—only this time the 
“ball” is a skull missing its lower jaw and marked with the familiar alternating pattern of 
black pentagons and white hexagons that define the appearance of a football. Videla 
appears to be standing among a mound of several of these skulls, imbibing in the death of 
                                                
80 This notion is reaffirmed by Bauso, who remarks that the only other event during the six-year 
rule of the Proceso that provoked a similar explosion of nationalism was the failed war to retake the 
Falklands (Islas Malvinas) in 1982, under the stewardship of Leopoldo Galtieri. Ironically, that conflict 
coincided with Argentina’s failed defense of their title at the World Cup in Spain.  See Bauso 204. 
 
81 Bauso 199. “Jorge Videla, mensaje al plantel argentino: Señores, así como el comandante 
arenga a la tropa, así como el presidente saluda y despide embajadores, así quiero exhortarlos a que se 
sientan y sean ganadores, ganadores del torneo, ganadores de la amistad, ganadores de la hidalguía y 
demuestren la calidad humana del hombre argentino.” 
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others to support the ‘78 Mundial. Every illustration containing a caricature of Videla 
thereafter retains this hyper-stylized, almost comically morbid characterization of the 
general. One image by an illustrator named Bellenger sees Videla dressed in his 
ceremonial military uniform, running a cup filled with water (in reality more of a 
fountain or basin, as it bears no resemblance to the real FIFA World Cup trophy) in order 
to wash the blood off his hands (fig. 25).  
Why would the artists of the boycott rely on tropes that communicated such 
outlandishly indiscriminate levels of sadism and murder? For many, the specters of 
Berlin 1936 materialized again with the controversy surrounding the Mundial. Both 
Almeida and Franco have argued that for activists in France and West Germany, the 
failure to denounce the 1936 Berlin Olympics was unfinished business, resulting in a 
“responsibility” among all Europeans to set the record straight where possible. Almeida, 
too, suggests a latent sense of frustration among the French sector of the boycott at the 
May 1968 student protests in Paris, which had failed to provoke radical social change.82 
With Hitler’s Olympics as their reference—along with the horrors of the war and 
genocide that would eventually follow—the anti-Mundial movements found a compelling 
visual strategy, as well as the possibility of “catharsis” from revisiting their own political 
past.83 
                                                
82 Almeida, “Temas pendientes,” 28. “De allí es que los activistas franceses y alemanes hayan 
homologado la dictadura argentina con los totalitarismos europeos, lo que también expone acaso un 
sentimiento de culpa acerca del grado de responsabilidad que la izquierda europea había tenido en dos 
acontecimientos puntuales: los Juegos Olímpicos de 1936, celebrados en Alemania bajo el régimen nazi, y 
la crisis de la izquierda europea posterior a Mayo del 68. Es posible conjeturar sobre el hecho de que estas 
cuestiones todavía estaban latentes en el 78 y que la izquierda europea –en particular la francesa– haya 
tomado como propio el boicot al Mundial... El recuerdo del 36 revivió en el 78, y despertó en los miembros 
del coba una “responsabilidad pendiente para todos los europeos”. See also Franco, “Derechos humanos, 
política y fútbol,” 30. 
 
83 Almeida, “Temas pendientes,” 28. 
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Football Makes Us Free: The Typology and Familiarity of Concentration Camps 
One anonymously designed flier from West Germany particularly drove home the 
tournament’s resonance with fascism and the Holocaust in Europe. A disheveled 
prisoner, chained to a giant ball, struggles to hoist its weight over his head while an 
Argentinian military officer— presumably Videla, recognizable because of his moustache 
despite not being named in the image—paints the black hexagons of a football onto the 
enormous sphere (fig. 26). “Argentinien WM 78” (an abbreviation of weltmeister, the 
German phrase for World Championship) is emblazoned across the top of the image, but 
more intriguing are the two subcaptions at the bottom of the frame: first, “Fussball macht 
frei” (“Football makes us free”), an ironic declaration that Almeida directly links to the 
words above the entrance to Auschwitz, “Arbeit macht frei” (“Work makes us free”). 
And then, beneath it, a phrase that immediately underlines the associations with Nazi 
Germany: “In Argentinien sind 10,000 menschen in konzentrationslagern” (“In 
Argentina, there are 10,000 people in concentration camps”). 
 References to concentration and extermination camps were a mainstay in the 
boycott’s illustrations and posters, as discussed previously with images such as COBA’s 
“Pas de football entre les camps de concentration” (fig. 14) and SKAN’s “Argentina ‘78: 
VOETBAL en FOLTERLING” (fig. 17). When not explicitly rendered, as in COBA’s 
image, the Argentinian dictatorship’s herding of its own civilian population into camps 
could be intimated by the use of barbed wire, skulls, or soldiers. Yet the methodology of 
state terror in Argentina were quite removed from these stereotypes. While rural centros 
clandestinos de detención certainly existed and sprung up around the country, methods of 
detaining and punishing prisoners differed greatly from those during the Holocaust, 
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particularly in Buenos Aires and its suburbs. Almeida notes that because the barbed-wire 
fence carried longstanding nonviolent rural associations in Argentina, torture centers 
lacked the “common physiognomy” of Nazi camps.84  
The Escuela Mecánica de la Armada, by far the most notorious site of genocide in 
Argentina, was stationed along the major throughway Avenida Libertador in Nuñez, not 
far from the Estadio Monumental. There was no barbed wire marking ESMA’s perimeter: 
iron fences surrounded the premises, as they still do, and the surrounding city blocks 
were heavily policed, but it was a site fully integrated into a bustling urban landscape.85 
Neither the main reception building nor the premises look like a prison, and it is here 
where we can identify arguably the most important divergence of the European boycott’s 
imagery from real life: the arrests, imprisonment, torture, and disposal of desaparecidos 
had little to do with the Nazi concentration camps.86 Argentina’s systematic elimination 
of supposed “subversives” and “terrorists” moved along a far different, though no less 
brutal, conception of efficacy. Graciela Daleo’s ordeal after Argentina beat the 
Netherlands in the World Cup final, trapped in a car with her torturers and unable to call 
                                                
84 Almeida, “Temas pendientes,” 32. “En la Argentina, el alambre de púas siempre estuvo 
vinculado al ámbito rural, sin un uso bélico específico. Por este motivo, la metáfora del alambre para referir 
al genocidio argentino es, de alguna manera, ajena. Los centros clandestinos de detención argentinos no 
tuvieron la fisonomía común de los campos alemanes, donde se pueden reconocer un conjunto de 
elementos distintivos, como la valla doble de alambre electrificado, por ejemplo. La antigua Escuela de 
Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA), el centro de exterminio quizás más reconocible, tiene un enrejado 
característico, que funciona como espacio intermedio entre el encierro y la libertad, entre el afuera y el 
adentro” 
  
85 This fact, incidentally, complicates the assassination of the EAM’s first president, General 
Omar Actis, who was ambushed and shot dead while en route to a press conference detailing EAM’s 
austere roadmap for the Mundial in September 1976. The close monitoring of the area surround ESMA has 
given rise to the theory that Captain Lacoste was responsible for Actis’ murder, thereby allowing him to 
take command of the organizing body, as detailed in Chapter II. See Eugenio Méndez, Alte. Lacoste, quién 
mató al Gral. Actis? (Córdoba: El Cid Editor, 1984).  
 
86 In addition to Sutton’s examination of female survivors’ testimonies, see Graciela Daleo, 
“Relato de una celebración forzada en la ESMA: Cuando ganar no es una victoria,” in “Papelitos, 78 
historias sobre un Mundial en dictadura.” 
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for help despite being in the presence of hundreds of witnesses, would have played out 
much differently—if at all—had ESMA been a camp-like prison.           
 Using Europe’s recent continental genocide to engage with an ongoing Latin 
American one, these images predated what Andreas Huyssen has termed the 
“globalization of Holocaust discourse” by several years, perhaps accounting for the 
disparity and loss of Argentina’s political context (beyond the junta) in the images.87 
Perhaps the most conspicuous omission from the European political cartoons, to this 
effect, is precisely that the presence of an absence is left unacknowledged. The graphic 
examples of mayhem, torture and detention based on the Holocaust do not begin to 
capture the hole left in Argentinian society as a generation of people were decimated, or 
marked by, the systematic abductions. In terms of artworks that spoke to the everyday 
experiences of citizens under the Proceso, the illustrators in support of the boycott opted 
largely for brutal shocks, explicit images of death and disfigurement—not the creeping 
dread that would have set in as members of local communities inexplicably disappeared, 
never to return.88  
Memories of the Holocaust conjured far different visual interpretations of bodily 
presence and injury in Europe than they did in Argentina; in the latter, these tropes 
responded directly to the visible (non)existence of the desaparecidos. Just a month before 
the return of democratic elections, in September 1983, came the Siluetazo (“silhouette 
                                                
87 Andreas Huyssen, “Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia” (Public Review 12.1, 2000), 22.  
88 Sociologist Estela Schindel notes that memorial artworks more accurately attesting to the 
feelings of societal discomfort, loss, or trauma sparked by the desapariciones only really emerged with the 
advent of democratic elections in 1983. These include the September 1983 aesthetic action el Siluetazo, 
which “revived” the disappeared using traced outlines of human bodies, and the ongoing practice of 
publishing missing persons notices in the newspaper Página/12. See Schindel, “Grasping the Global and 
the Local in Memorialisation Practices. Some Dialogues and Tensions between Latin America and Europe" 
(European Review 22.4, 2014). 
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action”). The massive part-installation, part-protest action sprung conceptually from 
Polish illustrator Jerzy Skapski’s artwork Każdy Dzień Oświęcimia (Every Day at 
Auschwitz), using that artwork’s memorialization of the Holocaust as a basis for 
articulating the nature of genocide in Argentina.89 Skapski created the image as an inset 
for the October 1978 issue of the UNESCO Courier, which fittingly focused on the theme 
of international human rights law and education. The print comprised a black background 
and exactly 2,370 small human silhouettes of varying size, traced in white, resembling 
twenty-four rows of seams or scars at first glance (fig. 27).  Skapski’s caption 
contextualizes why so many “bodies” are packed into the frame, explaining: “Every day 
at Auschwitz brought death to 2,370 people, and this is the number of figures represented 
above. The concentration camp at Auschwitz was in existence for 1,688 days, and this is 
the exact number of copies of this poster printed. Altogether some four million people 
died at the camp.”90 The Pole was deeply concerned with the human toll—at least in 
numerical terms—of the Holocaust. Unlike images such as “Argentinien WM 78: 
Fussball macht frei,” which simply estimated the number of disappeared persons in 
Argentina, Skapski’s print illustrated the corporeal lives lost to the machinery of Nazism: 
though the silhouettes are anonymous, too small to bear any distinctive identifying 
features, the presence of women and children among the dead is a poignant marker of the 
indiscriminate violence.  
                                                
89 María Guillermina. "Extrañamiento, despolitización y memoria social en la arte argentino de 
inicio de los 80" (Nómadas. Revista Crítica de Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas 37.1, 2013), 8. “La 
intervención tomaba como referente una obra publicada por ese entonces en el correo de la UNESCO y que 
se proponía reflexionar sobre el holocausto judío. Se establecía, en la producción de la obra, el referente del 
genocidio judío para comprender lo que había sucedido en nuestro país.” 
90 UNESCO Courier, October 1978, 22. 
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In Argentina, with the euphoria of the 1978 Mundial all but subsided and the 
Proceso’s grip on the nation weakening after 1982’s disastrous campaign in the Falkland 
Islands, recognition of the military’s heavy-handed methods turned increasingly vocal. 
Skapski’s Every Day at Auschwitz especially resonated with three Argentinian visual 
artists: Rodolfo Aguerreberry, Julio Flores, and Guillermo Kexel. The trio were aware of 
Skapski’s illustration for UNESCO and planned to upscale the human silhouettes for an 
exhibition in 1982. But the project was pushed back due to logistical difficulties, 
eventually finding an opening with the Third March of Resistance in Buenos Aires, on 
September 21, 1983, incorporated into the event’s proceedings with the last-minute 
assistance of the Madres and Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo.91 Aguerreberry, Flores, and 
Kexel were taken by Skapski’s exploration of the sheer number of lives lost to genocide, 
but their project was altogether more ambitious. The Siluetazo aimed to recreate the 
silhouettes at one-to-one human scale, with volunteers lying down on long rolls of paper 
to provide their bodies for tracing (fig. 28). The resulting “aesthetic action”—more of a 
workshop, which unexpectedly gathered thousands of participants making their own 
traces—was overwhelmingly popular, and when finalized, disquietingly visible.  
After the event, the silhouettes “were later fly-posted throughout the city center as 
a way of representing ‘the presence of an absence’;” as art historian Ana Longoni asserts, 
“the key to [the] gesture is quantification: pointing to the empty space that the 30,000 
absent bodies left among us.” 92 Moreover, it was also fundamentally about restitution, 
providing bodies to the desaparecidos whose physical existence was degraded and then 
                                                
91 Roberto Aguerrebery, Julio Flores, and Guillermo Kexel, “Las siluetas,” in El Siluetazo, 
compiled by Ana Longoni and Gustavo A. Bruzzone (Buenos Aires: Ana Hidalgo, editor, 2008), 74-75. 
92 Ana Longoni, “Photographs and Silhouettes: Visual Politics in the Human Rights Movement of 
Argentina,” Afterall: A Journal of Art, Context and Enquiry 25 (Autumn 2010), 9.  
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denied altogether by the dictatorship: “The gesture of lending one’s body carries a certain 
ambiguity, as to take the place of the missing person is to accept that anyone could have 
taken the place of the disappeared, that anyone could have suffered the same uncertain 
and sinister fate,” Longoni explains. “On the other hand, a corporality, a body and a life 
— however ephemeral—is returned to the disappeared.”93 The Siluetazo recognized that 
the desaparecidos were not an anonymous group, that they had faced unknown horrors, 
and that their absence could not be swept under the rug.  
Crucially, it also (literally) drew from the trauma of the Holocaust in a manner 
that that did not rely on scenes of destruction, treating the depiction of lost bodies with a 
sensitivity that is altogether lacking in images of the European boycott of the Mundial. 
Such a comparison is tempered by the Siluetazo’s function as an outlet for local 
discontent, built up over seven long years of military rule, and the event’s mantra of 
“Aparición con vida” (“Found alive”), a hopeful demand expressed by the Madres and 
Abuelas during the Third March and ever since. The Mundial and its controversy were 
subsumed into the wider backlash against the Proceso, but both the Siluetazo and 
Skapski’s original silhouettes provided alternate roadmaps for how artworks could have 
reconciled their memorial and activist purposes vis-à-vis the Argentinian and European 
genocides. 
This, however, is not meant as a ridicule of the artists working for COBA, SKAN, 
and other European collectives. James Young, in his discussion of public art and 
Holocaust memorials, has pushed back against the notions of good taste (or lack thereof) 
dictating the usefulness of those sites and artworks of memory accessible to all: “we must 
recognize that public taste carries weight and that certain conventional forms in avowedly 
                                                
93 Longoni 11. 
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public art may eventually have consequences for public memory—whether or not we 
think they should.”94 While Young is referring to public Holocaust memorials and 
monuments in this sense, I suggest that the same principle is easily applied to the 
illustrations emerging from the boycott of the Mundial. Though they were thoroughly 
divorced from the experiences of prisoners at Argentinian CCDs, and the sense of loss 
felt by those not disappeared, the symbols of concentration camps and mass 
extermination were nonetheless evocative and stirring images that effectively and 
instantly conveyed the gravity of the situation in Argentina to European audiences.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                
94 James Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Memory (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1993), 12. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION: THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE 
Commenting on the fractured nature of the 1978 World Cup in the Argentinian 
public consciousness, Matias Bauso argues that while now it “is impossible to explain the 
Mundial without the dictatorship...it is also impossible to explain it via the dictatorship 
alone.”95 He suggests that the Mundial was not so much a deliberate smokescreen to 
cover up the murder of Argentinian civilians on the military government’s part; more 
accurately, the decision to proceed with the tournament was one last throw of the dice to 
improve international public relations. The World Cup, Bauso hypothesizes, probably 
would have enjoyed just as much popular support in Argentina no matter who facilitated 
it so long as the football took place. 
In such a context, it is not unreasonable to think that any serious effort to boycott 
the tournament on COBA’s part would have been doomed to fail, insofar as it attempted 
to force other nations to withdraw from Argentina. But as Marek Halter has argued, the 
boycott was never about pressuring other teams to back out, let alone stopping the 
tournament altogether. “We never thought that we could keep the tournament from being 
played. Our intention was to spark a great international mobilization so that the whole 
world could see the true face of the military regime,” Halter remembers. “In that sense, it 
was a positive result… The Mundial went ahead, but the European press talked about 
torture and disappearances every day.”96 The goal of the protests, political cartoons, and 
                                                
95 Bauso 16. 
  
96 Bauso 215. “Marek Halter: Nunca pensamos que podríamos impedir que se jugará el torneo. 
Nuestra intención era crear una gran movilización internacional para que todo el mundo viera la verdadera 
cara del régimen militar. En ese sentido, el resultado fue positivo… El Mundial se jugó, pero la prensa 
europea hablaba todos los días de las torturas y desapariciones.” 
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denunciations, a systematic saturation of European sports pages with outrage, was to 
make the topic of human rights utterly unavoidable.  
This, ultimately, is the caveat to Bauso’s hypothesis that the Mundial would have 
been immensely popular regardless of the political situation in Argentina. Some have 
taken the ‘78 Mundial as one of the great successes of the dictatorship—author and 
attorney Pablo Llonto, for example, has called the tournament “the first massive seal of 
approval for the dictatorship” by the Argentinian public, and in turn the government’s 
first truly fascist act;97 similarly, Marcos Novaro and Vicente Palermo have postulated 
the aftermath of the Mundial as the junta’s most triumphant hour.98 But there is also the 
argument that the Mundial was really the beginning of the end for the Proceso de 
Reorganización Nacional. The international scrutiny the dictatorship invited onto itself by 
hosting one of the world’s most important sporting events was unbearable in the long 
term, and Bauso argues that the European boycott—the “successful failure” that erupted 
in the autumn of 1977—was a major contributing factor to the dictatorship’s embattled 
international relations over the next six years.99  
Given the highly publicized war of images and propaganda surrounding the 
Mundial, the unique ramifications that arose as a result of Argentina’s first world title can 
be aptly filtered through the lenses of visual and material culture. In Chapter III, I 
established that European responses to state violence borrowed heavily from regional 
memories of the Second World War in order to illustrate the connection between sport 
                                                
97 Llonto 6. “El Mundial aparece como el primer símbolo de aprobación masiva a la dictadura: 
Videla recibió seis veces el aplauso de las multitudes en estadios repletos.” 
 
98 Novaro and Palermo 166. “Quizá con el Mundial el régimen vivió sus mejores horas. Sus bases 
más firmes encontraron auténticos motivos para festejar: el triunfo coronaba el orden y el trabajo correctivo 
que debía hacerse.” 
 
99 Bauso 215. 
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and repression. Now, with the benefit of hindsight and memorial strategies geared to a 
distinctly Argentinian social history, local initiatives have begun to interrogate the uneasy 
tensions between football and human rights more pointedly than foreign groups such as 
COBA could have ever hoped for prior to 1978. Projects such as the exhibition Memorias 
del Mundial 78: una reflexión sobre deporte, DDHH y dictadura (A Reflection on 
Sports, Human Rights and Dictatorship) and “Papelitos, 78 historias sobre un Mundial en 
dictadura” (78 Stories About a Mundial under Dictatorship) precisely reframed the 
Mundial’s lasting character in the public consciousness as one that revolves around 
images and material objects, just as much around methods of repression and written 
rhetoric.100 “Papelitos” was particularly ambitious in this regard: a multimedia 
retrospective developed between arts and culture magazine NAN, the Royal Embassy of 
the Netherlands, and Memoria Abierta, the project commissioned a series of columns and 
interviews from journalists, scholars, and survivors on several aspects of the 
tournament—from modes of repression, the boycott (including its illustrations), and 
media and communications, to human rights and the outcome of the football itself.  
“Papelitos” was accompanied by the exhibition Tiren Papelitos: Mundial 78, 
entre la fiesta y el horror, staged in July and August 2018 at the Parque Nacional de la 
Memoria in Buenos Aires. The exhibition featured full-color reproductions of pamphlets 
from the boycott, as well as magazine covers on the topic of the Mundial and 
contemporary installations that spoke to the traumatic intersection of football and 
dictatorship. Yet, while the exhibition incorporated audio and video testimonies from 
                                                
100 Memorias del Mundial 78, shown at Argentina’s Archivo Nacional de la Memoria, did so by 
showcasing materials from EAM 78’s official archives (including infrastructural plans, internal 
communications, and officially published tourist guides), as well as images reproduced from the COBA 
boycott.  
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survivors of state terror in addition to the gamut of visual and material images on display, 
it is difficult to shake the feeling that the European boycott continues to impact the terms 
of discourse surrounding the Mundial today, even when it was initially directed at 
European audiences in 1978: propagating old tropes of violence, sensationalizing the 
horrors that today would otherwise be characterized by silence, anger, mourning, and 
reflection. 
There are still lessons to be learned from the war of images, and the wider climate 
of political manipulation and outcry, that so marked Argentina ’78. On an international 
scale, football’s ability to attract an audience is unparalleled; the FIFA World Cup 
remains one of the most viewed and most lucrative sporting events on the planet, and it is 
as susceptible as ever to employment as a quasi-smokescreen. The last edition of the 
tournament, Russia 2018, came under scrutiny for the host nation’s shock victory in the 
bidding process, the application of financial leverage therein perhaps sanctioned by 
Vladimir Putin himself.101 The next, Qatar 2022, has been marred by the exploitation and 
forced labor of migrant workers in dangerous conditions, as well as bribery accusations 
during the bidding process. Both issues have been addressed with what could generously 
be called half-hearted measures, despite pressure from Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, and others.102  
                                                
101 Ken Bensinger, “Did Russia Steal the World Cup?” New York Times, June 7, 2018. Retrieved 
from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/07/opinion/sunday/world-cup-fifa-corruption-russia.html> 
 
102 In 2017, Human Rights Watch released an assessment documenting Qatar’s failure to make 
construction site conditions safe for its workforce and urged both the Qatari government and FIFA to 
ensure minimum safety protocols, as well transparency when reporting the cause of migrant worker deaths. 
See Human Rights Watch, “Qatar: Take Urgent Action to Protect Construction Workers.” September 27, 
2017. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/27/qatar-take-urgent-action-protect-
construction-workers>  
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For Argentina, too, the impulse to remember and reflect is pressing. Conservative 
president Mauricio Macri caused widespread dismay in August 2016 when, in a live 
interview with Buzzfeed Español, he skirted questions about human rights. On the subject 
of ongoing tribunals against ex-military officers, the president made overtures towards 
the preservation of human rights, acknowledging that while it was “important to clear up 
the truth” about the dictatorship, it equally critical to preserve human rights “in the 21st 
century.”103 When asked by an online viewer if it was important to quantify the number 
of people disappeared by the Proceso, Macri offered that “it’s important to understand 
what happened, to give the families the right to know definitively what happened after 
the horrible tragedy that was the Dirty War.” Asked directly by another viewer if the 
number of desaparecidos totaled 30,000 people, Macri responded, “It’s a debate that I 
won’t get into. I don’t know if it was 9,000 or 30,000, if it’s the number of names etched 
into a wall [at Parque de la Memoria] or many more. It’s a discussion that doesn’t make 
any sense.”104 
Macri’s remarks drew widespread condemnation from activists, scholars, and left-
leaning columnists. Though not quite tantamount to denialism, the president’s 
marginalization of the issue was enough to suggest that the sector of Argentinian society 
that approved of the military dictatorship’s actions could feel emboldened once again. 
Sociologist Guillermo Levy, writing in Página/12, lambasted the president’s use of the 
phrase “Dirty War” and defended the figure of 30,000 desaparecidos, imploring that the 
justifications for that number not be lost in subsequent debates: “the number…was 
                                                
103 Mauricio Macri interviewed by Karla Zabuldovsky. Buzzfeed Español. August 10, 2016. 
Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z8UXK5F14o4 
 
104 Mauricio Macri interviewed by Karla Zabuldovsky. Buzzfeed Español. August 10, 2016. 
 
 57 
established in a time of struggle against the dictatorship and the impossibility of 
accessing any other records than the thousands of reports from around the country, and 
the valiant and militant work of hundreds of family members and friends who are always 
placed under suspicion.”105  
More troubling for Levy, however, was the possibility of losing or criminally 
under-valuing the revelatory testimonies that had come to light in the post-dictatorship 
era. In the same column, he referred to the experiences of those who survived the Nazi 
concentration camps during World War II, noting that those who did not testify “20 or 30 
years later” would never do so. Argentina’s stories, similarly, were in danger. “We have 
the disappeared who never returned, and we have those that that passed through 
hell…and came back. They came back to a society that didn’t want to hear their 
testimony, so fundamental for understanding the horror.” Likening the experiences of 
Argentinian survivors of CCDs to those who survived the Nazi camps, including the 
lingering sensations of survivor’s guilt, Levy poses a pair of damning questions with few 
clear answers: “How many do they number? Who counts the number of desaparecidos 
that survived?”106 
In closing, I will turn to one final artwork, a video installation exhibited as a part 
of Tiren Papelitos in 2018. Staged two years into the Macri administration, with the need 
to preserve the memory of the Argentinian genocide as relevant as ever, the exhibition 
was a timely intervention aimed at teasing out the more nuanced historical narratives 
                                                
105 Guillermo Levy, “No sólo números,” in Página/12, August 15, 2016. Retrieved from 
https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-306895-2016-08-15.html. “El número de desaparecidos se 
estableció en 30 mil en momentos de lucha contra la dictadura y de imposibilidad de acceder a más datos 
que las estimaciones provenientes de miles de denuncias en todo el país y la labor valiente y militante de 
cientos de familiares y amigos, que es puesta siempre bajo sospecha…” 
  
106 Guillermo Levy, “No sólo números,” in Página/12, August 15, 2016. 
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about Argentina ‘78’s place in popular culture. The video work in question, Ceremonia 
Nacional, is particularly indicative of a more sensational approach, however. At the 
opening ceremony of the 1978 World Cup, Videla gave a brief inaugural speech, 
avoiding the issues of Argentina’s political climate, as well as its diplomatic tensions 
with the rest of the world. The general—succinct and at his most presidential, before ever 
assuming the office itself—welcomed “the men and women of the most diverse regions 
of the Earth,” bringing with them “a climate of reciprocal respect.” He continued: 
...it is precisely the confrontation in the playing field and the friendship in the 
field of human relations what allow us to assure that it is possible, even today, to 
coexist in unity and diversity, which is the only way to build peace… that is why I 
ask God, Our Lord, for this event to be truly a contribution to the strengthening of 
peace, that same peace we all wish onto the whole world and onto all men of the 
world. This peace inside of which man can be fully realized as a person with 
dignity and in liberty.107 
 
Forty years later, the Argentina ‘78 opening ceremony, Videla’s speech, and the 
rapturous applause it garnered were shown again as a part of Tiren Papelitos, projected 
onto the walls of an intimate darkened room in Parque de la Memoria’s PAyS Gallery 
(fig. 29). Yet the installation’s creator, photographer and video artist Adriana Bustos, 
applied the simplest of twists to frame Videla and the Mundial as transgressors against 
Argentina and global human rights. On an adjacent wall, Bustos projected grainy black-
and-white footage of a procession of flags and athletes, cheering crowds, and the 
Olympic Cauldron, burning brightly: it is an excerpt from Leni Riefenstahl’s film 
Olympia, the official documentary of the Berlin ‘36 Summer Olympics, hosted by Nazi 
                                                
107 Ailín Bullentini, “Apertura del Mundial 78: El discurso inaugural de Videla,” in “Papelitos, 78 
historias sobre un Mundial en dictadura.” 
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Germany.108 In Bustos’ appropriation of the German footage, the Olympic cauldron is lit 
just as the whimsical, colorful choreography of the dancers converge on the center circle 
of the Estadio Monumental’s football field in the other film. The video piece concludes 
with familiar sights: simultaneous panoramic shots of the Monumental and Berlin 
Olympiastadion packed to the rafters, and coinciding with the beginning of Videla’s 
address, a close-up shot of Adolf Hitler. 
                                                
108 Eloisa Otero, “MUSAC / Adriana Bustos o el relato crítico de una artista observadora de la 
historia,” in Tam Tam Press. León: Museo de Arte Contemporáneo de Castilla y León. June 16, 2017. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Guillermo Gonzalez Ruiz and Ronald Shakespear, Argentina ‘78 official logo, 
1973. (Summa, iss. 117, October 1977) 
 
 
Fig. 2. Lance Wyman, Games of the XIX Olympiad Mexico ‘68 official logo, 1968. 
(Almeida 2013) 
 
 
Fig. 3. Otl Aicher, Games of the XX Olympiad Munich 1972 official logo, 1972. 
(Almeida 2013) 
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Fig. 4. Luis Riera, Argentina ‘78 official logo (2nd version), 1974. 
(Almeida 2013) 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Juan Domingo Perón, deceased former president of Argentina (1973-1974). 
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Fig. 6. Mundialito (also known as Gauchito), official mascot of the 1978 World Cup.  
(Almeida 2013) 
 
 
Fig. 7. Manuel García Ferré, Redesigned Mundialito (also known as Gauchito), official 
mascot of the 1978 World Cup. (Summa, iss, 177, October 1977) 
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Fig. 8. Eduardo Lopez, Argentina ‘78 / XI Campeonato Mundial de Fútbol official 
poster, 1977. (Bauso 2018) 
 
 
Fig. 9. Eduardo López, model photograph for Argentina ‘78 poster, 1977. (Bauso 2018) 
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Fig. 10. Burson-Marsteller & Associates, “Los argentinos somos derechos y humanos” 
sticker, 1979. (Almeida 2013) 
 
 
Fig. 11. Front cover of Somos, April 14, 1978: “Desde Europa: COMPLOT CONTRA 
LA ARGENTINA.” (Left: Almeida 2013; right: image taken by author) 
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Fig. 12. “Defienda su Argentina” advertisement with detachable postcard, Para Tí, 
August 1978. (Bauso 2018) 
 
 
  
Fig. 13. “Mostremos al mundo como somos los argentinos” Mundial ‘78 advertisement, 
1978. (Video courtesy of Raro VHS) 
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Fig. 14. COBA, Boycott de la Coupe du Monde 78 / Pas de football entre les camps de 
concentration, 1978. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Anonymous. “ARGENTINA 78: Fußball ja—folter nein!” 1978. 
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Fig. 16. Zille-Kollektiv, “Argentina ‘78,” 1978 
 
 
Fig. 17. SKAN, “Argentina ‘78: VOETBAL en FOLTERING.” 1978. 
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Fig. 18. Plantu. “Logo officiel” cartoon, in La Coupe déborde, Videla! 1978. 
(Image courtesy of Archivo Nacional de la Memoria) 
 
 
Fig. 19. Movimiento Peronista Montoneros, “Argentina campeón sin milicos ni orejon,” 
1978. (Image courtesy of Archivo Nacional de la Memoria) 
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Fig. 20. Lesueur, “Et paf! Deux zero!” in La Coupe déborde, Videla! 1978.  
(Image courtesy of Archivo Nacional de la Memoria) 
 
 
Fig. 21. Puig Rosado, “El parto de La Justicia,” in La Coupe déborde, Videla! 1978.  
(Image courtesy of Archivo Nacional de la Memoria) 
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Fig. 22. Amnesty International. “Argentinien ‘78: Fussball Ja—Folter Nein.” 1978. 
 
 
Fig. 23. Enrique Ortega, “Hitler 36, Videla 78; or sport in service of political 
propaganda,” in Cambio 16, 1977. (Image courtesy of Archivo Nacional de la Memoria) 
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Fig. 24. COBA, La Coupe déborde, Videla! 1978. 
(Image courtesy of Archivo Nacional de la Memoria) 
 
 
 
Fig. 25. Bellenger, untitled illustration, in COBA, La Coupe déborde, Videla! 1978. 
(Image courtesy of Archivo Nacional de la Memoria) 
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Fig. 26. Anonymous. “Argentinien WM 78: fussball macht frei.” 1978. (Almeida 2013) 
 
 
Fig. 27. Jerzy Skapski, Każdy Dzień Oświęcimia (Every Day at Auschwitz), 1978. 
(Almeida 2013) 
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Fig. 28. Rodolfo Aguerreberry, Julio Flores, and Guillermo Kexel. El Siluetazo. Buenos 
Aires, Argentina, September 21, 1983. (Photograph by Eduardo Gil) 
 
 
Fig. 29. Adriana Bustos, Ceremonia Nacional, 2016. 
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